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Abstract 
It is sometimes said the Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden have 
found a magic way of combining high taxes and lavish welfare systems with fast growth and 
unemployment. Some credit this to the triumph of social democracy, others to open markets 
and free trade tempered by a comprehensive security net. And many have in the past, and still 
do, predicted the end of the Nordic Model because there is no such thing as magic, and even 
the Nordic countries must sooner or later face the world’s harsh realities. The goal of this 
thesis is to investigate the traits of the Nordic Model and assess its robustness in the face of 
the Global Financial crisis and the years to come. To achieve this end, a Nordic Model is 
constructed based on the earlier work of Erling Barth, Kalle Moene and Michael Wallerstein 
that finds centralised wage setting processes and the resulting wage compression to form an 
institutional equilibrium that is at the base of the Nordic Model. This study finds that with a 
possible exception of Denmark, the institutional equilibrium is still robust in the Nordic 
countries, and has not been affected by the Global Financial crisis. The findings also call the 
exact nature of the hypothesised relationship between centralised wage setting processes and 
wage compression into question. 
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1. Introduction 
The Nordic Model, known under many names, is a peculiar model of society that combines 
free trade, a generous welfare state and good governance in a way that has defied economic 
textbooks since the Second World War. Many scholars have taken an interest in the 
phenomena, and the professions of economics, political science, sociology, history and 
anthropology have all made contributions and debated just how this model is possible and 
why it still works. And perhaps mostly in the economics and political science profession, why 
it will not work for much longer and how its demise will come about. So far, these predictions 
have not come true and the Nordic Model has persisted despite economic crises and change in 
the political landscape in the past thirty years.  
Will this time be different? Since 2008, the world has been embroiled in the worst economic 
downturn since the Great depression in the 1930’s, and as open economies who have 
embraced globalization the Nordic countries are especially vulnerable. And they have been hit 
hard, with Norway as the sole exception who has yet to experience a severe economic 
downturn. Despite having experienced sharper falls in GDP and higher rise in unemployment 
that the OECD average, the Nordic countries still seem to do well in terms of not falling into a 
poverty traps or having to dismantle the generous welfare benefits that keeps the population 
with free education, health care and pensions. So far, inequality does not seem to have risen 
much, and the Nordic model remains secure as a policy goal for political parties of all colours.  
But can it be that the crisis has affected the model, or its foundation in some way? Just how 
secure is it? Could it be that this time will indeed be different? Or will the Nordic countries 
once again successfully reform the Model in a way that retains its ability to distribute wealth 
and pool risks like it has since the Second World War while adapting to new conditions?  
In this thesis, I hope to find the answer to these questions. Given the short time that has 
passed since 2008, merely five years, I doubt that decisive evidence for a change in the 
fundamentals of the model will be found, but signs of change may be there. By identifying 
signs of change, should they be there, and comparing them with the experience from the last 
crisis, I believe much can be garnered about the possible future of the Nordic model. Another 
goal of this paper is to establish an analytical framework that can later be used to revisit the 
analysis made now when more time has passed and more data is available. 
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This paper then aims to answer two questions: “How robust is the institutional equilibrium 
that upholds the Nordic Model?” and “Has the Global Financial Crisis disturbed this 
institutional equilibrium?”  
The theoretical framework of this thesis is in large part the analysis of the Scandinavian (and  
more specifically Norwegian) model of redistribution by Erling Barth, Kalle Moene and the 
late Michael Wallerstein (2003), “Equality under pressure”, written during the Norwegian 
“Power  and democracy Study” 1998-2003. The authors construct a comprehensive 
framework for understanding the foundations of the institutional equilibrium that supports and 
reinforces the Nordic model, as well as considering the risks that globalization and the 
model’s own success reputedly pose to the model’s long term survival. In light of the recent 
crisis and reform suggestions that have been aired (Korkman, Holmström, Honkapohja, 
Torben, Vartiainen og Söderström 2007), I believe their analysis is more relevant than ever 
and can be put to good use in this paper.  
By drawing upon other sources of both theory and empirical evidence in addition to their 
book I aim to investigate the most critical traits of the Nordic Model as it is today, and come 
to preliminary conclusions about the future of the model as a fundament for Scandinavian 
society. Due to language barriers and limits on time and resources, I will only include 
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark in the analysis and regrettably omit Iceland from this 
study. Ever the outlier in geographical and linguistic terms, Iceland has never received much 
attention from students of political science, and there is thus little for me to build upon. Also, 
like Barth et al, Norway will receive the most attention, both because of my greater 
knowledge of the country and because it has so far avoided most of the hardships seen in 
Denmark and Sweden. 
While “Equality under pressure” is the fundament of this study, I have strived to include 
perspectives on the Nordic Model that is not given much attention in that book. For that 
reason, variables that represent perspectives often offered by economists and those social 
scientists who study trust in and legitimacy of political institutions have been included. The 
theoretical framework provided in “Equality under pressure” does not omit these perspectives, 
but puts somewhat less emphasis on their importance compared to the necessity of wage 
compression that leads to less income inequality and a generous welfare state. It therefor 
follows that these two traits of the Nordic Model will receive more attention and emphasis 
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also in this study, and in the spirit of driving research forward, the period since “Equality 
under pressure” and to date will be the main time frame of interest.  
The rest of this chapter will give an overview of the context from which the ideas for this 
paper came from, namely the debate regarding the survivability and indeed desirability of the 
Scandinavian type welfare model of society and the much touted warning that globalisation 
and economic crisis would spell the end of it. While the prosperity (in Norway in particular) 
of late 2000’s may have slowed our memory of earlier economic crises, they are neither new 
or unheard of in Scandinavia, and a forceful reminder was given in the form of the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008 with spectacular the implosion of the Icelandic economy at its peak. 
To put this study in context, I will therefor include accounts of both the Nordic Banking crisis 
of the 1990’s and the recent financial crisis. The latter will receive the most attention, 
including an overview of the individual countries economic performance sin the years leading 
up to the crisis, during and after. Coupled with analysis of the development in variables 
through descriptive statistics, this should provide a good opportunity to test the robustness of 
the Nordic Model in face of economic crisis. 
1.2 The Welfare State and its many challenges. 
The death of the Nordic model has been predicted at more or less regular intervals over the 
past thirty years, often in conjugation with worries over future fiscal obligations given the 
large pensions owed to future cohorts of retirees and less working age adults to support them, 
or mass unemployment following sudden international economic shocks (Korkman et al. 
2007), (Andersen 1997). What merits do these worries and predictions have? The short 
answer seems to be that the Nordic model has so far made it through all crises to this date 
more or less intact, something the Economist claim is due to the utter determination of 
politicians to push through reform where it is needed (Economist 2013). It should be noted 
however that the same newspaper has been among the critics of the welfare arrangements in 
the Nordic countries and welfare states in general, and did not without some smugness 
proclaim that belief in a special Nordic model, a third way, would crumble further in 2007 
(Pete 2006). Other critics have claimed a generous welfare state will cause economic 
disincentives to individuals which will eventually destroy the welfare state itself (Lindbeck 
1995).  
The criticism can roughly be divided in two categories: One that worries about the future 
costs and thus sustainability of the welfare state, and one of more normative character that 
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sees the welfare state along with state intervention in the free market as a problem in itself. 
Often the two go hand in hand however, as criticism of costs are usually made with the 
normative assumption that high taxes, economic redistribution, a bloated public sector and 
generous welfare regimes harm economic growth, reward complacency and opposition to 
necessary reform, and causes the national economy to be uncompetitive on the world market.  
This view is largely credited to the rise of neoliberalism as it became an economic orthodoxy 
after Keynesian economics fell out of favour in the 1970’s and was replaced with Thatcherism 
and Reaganomics. Neoliberalism has undergone both transformation and evolution since then 
(O'Hara 2010), and its influence worldwide today is undeniable. As will be evident in the next 
sections, both the OECD and other international organisations concerned with economic 
development has acquired a habit of consistently proposing reform suggestions that aim to 
reduce government expenses. This advice is also often given to the Nordic countries in spite 
of their apparent success a high tax - high growth economies.  
It is against this backdrop that I wish to investigate the Nordic Model and the institutional 
equilibrium that it rests on so that a better understanding of how it has developed since the 
time of Bath et als study and how it may be affected by the Global Financial crisis and 
uncertain future that follow can be achieved. 
1.3 Financial crises in the North  
For the purpose of a better analysis, a brief look-back at the last financial crisis to affect the 
Nordic countries could be helpful. Several similarities to the crisis of 2008 can be seen in the 
build-up to the Nordic Banking crisis, and a much discussed question is whether the economic 
policy of the Nordic countries during the recent crisis has been informed by the lessons 
learned during and after the Banking crisis. 
The Nordic Banking crisis came as much as a surprise as the recent crisis on economists, 
policy-makers and the public of the Nordic countries. Why should such a crisis take place in 
advanced Nordic welfare states with long records of combining egalitarian societies with 
strong economic performance? (Jonung, Vartia og Kiander 2009). Steigum (2011) and Jonung 
et al all point to the rapid financial liberalization that took place in the Nordic countries during 
the 1980s combined with pegged exchange rates and an external shock in the form of high 
German interest rates following the unification as the cause of the crisis that brought the 
financial institutions of Norway, Sweden and Finland to their knees. That it was not inevitable 
that a crisis would happen can perhaps explain why the crisis when it came was met with such 
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astonishment and surprise. Steigum for example, states that had it not been for rising real 
interests in Germany, the Norwegian banking crisis in 1991-92 would probably not have 
happened. For Finland and Sweden, the crisis also had far reaching consequences of 
permanently higher unemployment rates, made even worse by the collapse of the exports to 
the Soviet Union as it dissolved in the case of Finland. At least in terms of how taken by 
surprise politicians, economists and the public were by the Nordic Banking crisis, we can 
draw some parallels to recent financial crisis. 
An extensive literature has analysed the causes of the financial crisis that rocked the world in 
2008 (Jonung et al. 2009), and while everything from too lax to too tight regulation of the 
financial markets has been blamed, it is generally agreed that the Nordic countries were for 
the most part innocent bystanders this time. While the possible effect of Global Financial 
Crisis on the Nordic Model is one of the questions investigated in this thesis, the crisis itself is 
not the central puzzle to be explained here and will therefore not be analysed to any 
significant extent. While the causes and ultimate consequences of the financial are still hotly 
debated, economists and political scientists alike now seem to converge on a general account 
of what happened, if not why.  
The starting date of the Global Financial Crisis is usually set to the failure of  Lehman 
Brothers in 2008 that caused widespread financial panic, first in the USA where the sup-prime 
market collapsed and quickly spread to Europe and the rest of the world as the intra-bank 
lending the world’s financial system depended on was effectively suspended. However, some 
hold that the first signs of trouble appeared in early 2007 in the ABX market for synthetic 
mortgage-backed securities (Thorvaldur 2010). Others look to accumulated trade imbalances 
in the world economy and large budget deficits in the US economy in particular as possible 
explanations (Szyszka 2011). Some economists exemplified by Krugman (2009) holds the 
view that the Global Financial Crisis was a classic liquidity trap in Keynesian terminology 
and that it carried some resemblance to and was foreshadowed by the East-Asian crisis and its 
consequences for Russia and Latin America. He also emphasises, like the others mentioned, 
the role of the shadow banking system and how it came to be as a consequence of the era of 
financial deregulation of which also the Nordic Banking crisis was a result of.  
While the crisis originated in the USA, its consequences were quickly felt throughout the 
world as panic spread, and ultimately the Nordic countries were also affected. The following 
sections give an chronological overview of how the situation developed year for year in the 
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four countries seen through the eyes of the Organisation for Economic Coordination and 
Development (OECD) and their economic outlook reports. I have chosen to present this view 
not only to show how the financial crisis affected each country, but also to illustrate the 
inherent uncertainty of economic predictions and to provide a contrast to the social 
democratic narrative that is present in the greater part of this thesis. 
1.3.2 Denmark 
The Danish economy was in risk of overheating as it entered 2008 after years of substantial 
growth, and while the OECD projections suggested a somewhat lower growth than its 
neighbours in the Euro zone, the organisation maintained that the trend was a positive one 
(OECD 2008a). Their next report was less optimistic and noted that the Global Financial 
Crisis had hit the Danish economy hard and caused the greatest fall in the country’s GDP seen 
in the past forty years. The result was a deep recession. Denmark shared a similarity with the 
USA in that the financial crisis coincided with the end of a period with rapidly rising real 
estate prices, though unique among the Nordic countries in that respect. While this probably 
deepened the recession, the organisation argued that the stability of Denmark’s political 
system strengthened the country’s ability to combat the crisis and that the fiscal and monetary 
policies employed in reaction to the crisis were sufficient for the time being. The OECD also 
predicted higher unemployment in the foreseeable future and expressed some concern for the 
competitiveness of the Danish economy because of rising wages (OECD 2009). The Global 
Financial crisis and the consequent Euro crisis proved disastrous for the export industry in 
particular, and exports fell by 13,5 % in the second quarter of 2009 compared to 2008. In spite 
of this, the organisation predicted a gradual improvement of the Danish economy from 2010 
and onward. 
At the time of the latest OECD report in January 2012, Denmark had only partially recovered 
from the economic slowdown following the financial crisis, as well as the unwinding of the 
property boom. The report noted that Denmark’s fiscal position is relatively sound, but falling 
productivity and competiveness are eroding potential growth, and the financial sector is still 
vulnerable. The government’s stimulus packages will boost economic activity in 2012, but 
fiscal consolidation will dampen recovery well into 2013 (OECD 2012a).  
1.3.3 Finland 
OECD find in their 2006 report on Finland that the country has experienced among the best 
growth performances of its member states in the past few years, underpinned by strong 
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innovation and high educational attainment. The short term macroeconomic outlook is found 
to be promising, especially in regard to a surprisingly strong increase in employment that is 
expected to continue into the following years (OECD 2006). Two years later, in june 2008, 
the finish economy was still in good shape and lauded as performing very well over the last 
decade by the following OECD report. Finland is found to have good chances of benefitting 
from the opportunities of globalization, but the report also finds many areas with room for 
improvement, among them labour markets, and calls for education and tax reform to meet the 
challenges ahead (OECD 2008b). 
By the time of the next OECD report in April 2010, the macroeconomic situation was 
reversed, and report noted that while a well regulated and well run financial sector had 
insulated the country from the direct effects of the global financial crisis, the worldwide 
recession and collapse in trade hit Finland harder than most other OECD countries. Exports 
were down by almost a third compared to 2008, GDP fell by 9 %, and recovery has been 
slower than in most other OECD countries. Furthermore, a sizeable budget surplus of 5,2 % in 
2007 is expected to swing to a similar deficit in 2011. To counter the recession, several 
budget stimuli have been enacted, mostly as tax cuts and reduced social security contribution. 
While the budget stimuli are at average OECD level, it is somewhat unique in being mostly 
permanent in nature. On the positive side, the government’s fiscal policy and lowered interest 
rates by the ECB has cushioned fall in employment levels, and negative growth in GDP has 
come to a halt (OECD 2010a).  
In early 2012, the world economy went into a new slump, and the Finnish macroeconomic 
outlooks continued to be bleak. GDP had contracted for a total of 10 % peak-to-through 
despite resilient domestic demand and a sound financial sector. Furthermore, exports were 
still 20 % lower than 2008 peak and unemployment had peaked at 9 % in early 2010, only 
retracting slowly since. Finally, GDP remains at 3% below 2008 level. In addition to the 
already experienced consequences of the financial crisis, Finland now faces challenges in the 
areas of stagnating labour markets falling inflation and reduced international demand for its 
main exports. On the positive side of things, Finland’s financial sector remains solid, as is its 
long-term fiscal position if addressed now (OECD 2012b).  
1.3.4 Norway 
The apparent resilience of the Norwegian economy in the face of the global financial crisis is 
interesting in itself, but a look back at past financial crisis during the last 100 years provides 
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even more food for thought. The Institute for Research in Economics and Business 
Administration at NHH produces several reports on the financial crisis in collaboration with 
Norwegian authorities under the project title “SNF project no 1306: Crisis, Restructuring and 
Growth”. In one report dealing with the macroeconomic perspective, Norway’s experience 
with past financial crisis was briefly mapped out (Almås, Doppelhofer, Haatvedt, Klovland, 
Molnar og Thøgersen 2010). Here it is shown that in relative terms, Norway escaped lightly 
also from the Great Depression. And while the interwar period was one of many economic 
crisis for many countries of the world, Norway’s growth record in that period was remarkably 
good, almost as good as the post-war period up to the 1970’s, and better than the periods 
before 1910 and in the 70s and 80s. Adding to this, Norway experienced an economic 
downturn and crisis while the rest of the world was riding a wave of economic growth in the 
early to middle 1920’s, and was one of the countries engulfed by the Nordic Banking Crisis 
though the country least affected, once again. The apparent novel behaviour of the Norwegian 
economy in relation to past crisis is interesting in itself, but once again outside the scope of 
this paper.  
Turning back to the recent global financial crisis, it too was shorter and more shallow than in 
most OECD countries, arriving two quarters later, ending one quarter earlier, and causing a 
contraction in GDP of less than half the OECD average between mid-2008 and mid-2009 
(OECD 2010b). Previous reports from the OECD underline Norway’s favourable fiscal 
position before the onset of the crisis, citing a period of strong economic growth where low 
levels of unemployment, inflation and improving terms of trade have produced large gains in 
real income for Norwegian households. In addition, prudent management of petroleum 
revenues have contributed to the sound public finances (OECD 2007a), (OECD 2008c).  The 
reports however, also express concern over the long term effects of the high wages in the 
petroleum sector on the “mainland economy”, as well as rising pension and healthcare costs 
in the future due to an aging population. When the global financial crisis did hit Norway in 
mid-2008, the Norwegian government enacted expansive fiscal stimulus and Norges Bank cut 
interest rates aggressively.  
By the end of 2011, fiscal stimulus had been reined back somewhat from the expansion in 
2009-2010, and the monetary policies were beginning to return to normal as financial markets 
had calmed and the extraordinary measures were no longer needed (OECD 2012c). The report 
further notes that Norway had weathered the financial crisis well, and focused its attention on 
how to sustain growth in the coming years, a topic not seen in many other OECD reports of 
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that year. Improved terms of trade and prudent management of the petroleum wealth which 
lead to a very strong fiscal position is stated explain much of the resilience of the Norwegian 
economy during and after the recession.  
1.3.5 Sweden 
In its 2007 report, the OECD lauds Sweden for an excellent macroeconomic performance 
with high rates of growth, low unemployment, structural budget surplus and stable inflation 
while voicing concerns about the fact that employment levels have not reached the heights of 
before the Nordic banking crisis in the early 1990’s, and that especially immigrants and 
young people experience considerable levels of unemployment. Furthermore, the OECD 
warns against distortions in the housing market, especially in urban areas. The report 
concludes that Swedens macroeconomic outlook is sound, and lists combating exclusion in 
the labour market and price distortions in the housing market as key challenges for the 
Swedish economy (OECD 2007b).  In their next report from late 2008, OECD notes that 
Sweden’s solid economic institutions and fundamentals makes the country well prepared to 
cope with the consequences of the global financial crisis. During the summer of 2008, 
inflation hiked to over 4 %, and the Swedish Central Bank promptly raised the repo-interest 
rate to 4,75 %. Following a worsening of the crisis and thus lowered inflation forecasts, the 
rate was lowered to 3,75 % in October 2009. The report adds that the rates might be cut 
further as growth slows further (OECD 2008d). 
 
The strength of Sweden’s fiscal positions is further highlighted in the OECD report from early 
2011 where Sweden is experiencing a strong recovery after a deep, but short recession. 
Aggressive cuts in interest rates by the Riksbank, unconventional monetary policies and 
automatic stabilizers helped mitigate the downturn, and Sweden is now in a enviable position 
of recovery compared to much of the OECD countries. Despite its strong fiscal position 
before the crisis, Sweden experienced a sharp contraction in output by around 7,5 %, largely 
because of external factors such as drop in export. The rebound was similarly strong, with real 
GDP growing by 4,5 % from 2009 to 2010, and close to 7% in the third quarter of 2010. By 
fall of 2010, total GDP was still 1% lower than pre-crisis level. Following the growth in 
output, employment levels have also started to rise, though only modestly as of late 2010 
(OECD 2011b).  
 
In their latest report on Sweden in December 20120, the OECD once again lauds Sweden’s 
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strong fiscal position and how it has enabled the country to withstand the global crisis. Even 
though growth in real GDP slowed from 3,8 % in 2011 to 1,2 in 2012, the organization 
expects both domestic consumption and exports to pick up in 2014, and projects a growth of 3 
% for the Swedish economy in 2014. Though the Swedish outlooks remain substantially 
better than for most OECD countries, the report notes several challenges. Among them are 
rising long-term unemployment for some groups, rising income dispersion, high household 
and corporate debt, a large and concentrated banking system that may prove vulnerable to 
further external shocks, maintaining financial stability an upholding fiscal prudence while 
preserving the welfare system (OECD 2012d).  
1.3.6 Summary 
To summarise, while the Global Financial Crisis may have originated in the US economy, it 
quickly spread to Europe and the rest of the world through an interconnected and 
interdependent financial system. All of the Nordic countries were affected by the crisis but 
not equally. Denmark and Finland took the heaviest blow in terms of fall in GDP and rise in 
unemployment while Norway escaped relatively unscathed. Sweden was hard hit as well. 
Fiscal stimulus packages were enacted to combat the crisis in all of the Nordic countries, and 
vigorously so in Norway in particular where the fiscal stimulus to the 2009 budget revision 
was estimated to 2,3 % of GDP (Finansdepartementet 2009). Whether this stimulus was the 
reason for Norway’s quick way out of the crisis is still under debate.  
More relevant to this thesis however is the question of whether the Global Financial Crisis 
had an effect on the Nordic Model, which will be conceptualised in the next chapter. 
2. The Nordic model 
To the students and scholars of economics, sociology and political science the countries of the 
Scandinavia have usually been seen as a category of their own, something quite different than 
their southern neighbours in continental Europe, western Britain and the eastern Baltics 
together with Russia. The difference lies in both the economic, social and political dimension, 
and scholars of all three professions have conceptualized models with titles such as “The 
Nordic Model” (Korkman et al. 2007), “The Scandinavian Distribution Model” (Barth et al. 
2003) or “the Scandinavian Welfare Model” (Andersen 1997) to name a few of the many 
labels that have followed extensive research by a broad range of scholars into the phenomena. 
While different professions and scholars, including the author of this thesis, have studied 
different aspects of the phenomena in the tradition of his field, it can with little degree of 
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uncertainty be argued that the Scandinavian countries all share a collection of unique traits in 
all three dimension that can be fruitfully conceptualized as a model that with some cross-
country variation gives an accurate representation of the Scandinavian countries. There is now 
a broad consensus that a Nordic or Scandinavian Model exists although there are critics who 
argues on the contrary (Alestalo, Hort og Kuhnle 2013).  
The fundamental assumption of this paper is that a Nordic/Scandinavian model exist, that this 
model is valid for all three countries in question, and that its defining traits have been 
identified and change to them can be measured over time. What this concept is called is more 
a matter of research question and field of study than definition, and while every scholar tends 
to adjustments to better highlight what is important to his research. For the sake of simplicity 
I will in this thesis make use of the label “the Nordic Model”, though other labels may occur 
when references are made to other works on the subject, and should be understood as 
interchangeable with the Nordic Model.  
2.1 What is the Nordic model? 
Given the existence and validity of a Nordic Model is assumed in this paper, its unique traits 
and characteristics, as well as cross country variations will be presented in the following 
pages. I will first start with outlining the broadest characteristics that constitute the 
fundamentals of today’s model, and then go more into detail at where the countries diverge 
and to what extent.  
Starting at the contributions from the economics profession, Korkman et al concludes that 
there exists a social and economic system that can usefully be referred to as the Nordic 
Model, and lists the principal features of the model as the following: A comprehensive 
welfare state financed by taxes on income and consumption, high public spending on 
investments in education and child care, and a set of labour market institutions that includes 
strong unions and employer association, wage coordination, active labour market policies and 
generous unemployment benefits. The economists further emphasize the success of the 
Nordic Model in the past noting the good economic performance of the Scandinavian 
countries despite neoclassical economic textbooks and conventional wisdom suggesting that 
generous welfare benefits and high public spending hampers growth instead of enhancing it, 
hence making the Nordic Model an example of the “bumble-bee that can fly” (Korkman et al. 
2007). Korkman et al gives an in-depth account of the Nordic Model from an economist’s 
point of view, and gives several recommendations for reform at the end of their book, 
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interestingly much in the spirit of neoclassical economics rather than the more Keynesian 
variant that could be expected. These recommendations will be picked up again later in the 
chapter when the challenges of the Nordic Model in face of economic downturns, the research 
question of this thesis, are discussed. 
Moving on to the political dimension, Barth et al presented an analysis of what they call the 
Scandinavian Distribution Model as a part of the second Norwegian Power Study conducted 
between 1998 and 2003. Their research focused more on the institutional arrangements in the 
labour market and the welfare state. In particular, they emphasize on distribution of income 
through taxes, central wage bargaining that results in wage compression and the universal 
character of the welfare state. These arrangements together form what the authors call ‘the 
institutional equilibrium’, which is necessary for the model to perform well. The authors find 
that the greatest challenges to the Nordic Model is any change that would disturb this 
equilibrium, such as opposition to wage compression from the highly educated white collar 
employees or reduction in the importance of centralized wage bargaining that in turn would 
weaken the support to and legitimacy of the universal and generous welfare state. An 
interesting finding in their book is that the Nordic model did not make the institutions of the 
labour market and the welfare state, but that these institutions made the Nordic Model 
possible. Furthermore, the Model is a result of social experiments with uncertain outcomes, a 
cumulative process of trial and error which resulted in what can be called an institutional 
equilibrium, and not a planned or foreseen development.  (Barth et al. 2003). I will expand 
more on this later in the chapter. 
Another analysis of the political dimension is offered by Alestalo et al, who argues that three 
“master statements” about the Nordic Model can be drawn from the contemporary literature: 
A deep trust in and extensive prevalence of the State in society, the universal character of the 
welfare state, and a high degree of income equality for the societies as a whole. The authors 
give a detailed account of the historical conditions that were unique to Scandinavia, much in 
line with Barth et al, and give consideration to the future of the model in the face of 
globalization, immigration and interestingly a possible de-globalization. 
In conceptualizing the Nordic Model for this paper, I will mainly draw on the characteristics 
identified in the three papers discussed above.  
2.2 Conceptualizing the Nordic Model 
In the previous section I have presented some of the most recurring traits of the Nordic Model 
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as found by scholars of different professions. In this section I will conceptualize the Nordic 
Model for this thesis by drawing on the literature already presented, and some articles not yet 
included.  
As pointed out earlier, there are about as many conceptualizations as there are authors writing 
about it, and I have no intention to end this tradition for a number of reasons. First, a model is 
exactly that, a model to simplify reality so that generalizations may be made. A model must 
therefore be conceptualized around the question we wish to investigate. This thesis is 
concerned with the effect of economic crisis on a phenomena that has at least three 
dimensions; economic, political and social, and therefore requires a somewhat different 
conceptualization of the Nordic model than one concerned only with labour markets or class 
struggle.  
Second, this thesis is concerned with four countries over time and across three dimensions, 
and must therefore be more general than one concerned with fewer countries. It must also be 
tailored to catch the difference between the countries while still being relevant for all four. In 
other words, compromises must be made to balance the need for generalization with accuracy, 
and the inclusion of another country (say Iceland) or exclusion (say Norway) would require 
adjustments that would make for a slightly different model. 
In short, different research question result in different definitions and conceptualisations. That 
different models carry different names does not mean that they are essentially about 
something else however. As such I do not find it problematic to draw from different models to 
conceptualize a Nordic Model specified for this particular thesis, considering that the 
similarities far outnumber the differences.  
The financial crisis’s effects on economic growth, unemployment, public spending and other 
macro-economic indicators have been the subject of substantial research since it began, and is 
therefore not the subject of this thesis. Instead, this thesis is concerned about if, how and to 
what degree the crisis has affected the Nordic Model in itself, broken down to a set of key 
variables. Broadly speaking, what makes the Nordic Model “Nordic” is the combination of 
economic openness, extensive social protection based on universal principles, and 
encompassing collective bargaining coordination (Dølvik 2013). But a more detailed 
description of the Nordic model, in which change can be measured, there are other traits to 
consider. Drawing on the literature presented so far, the next section will present six variables 
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that represent the defining traits of the Nordic model, and will be the subject of testing in the 
remainder of the thesis. 
On the basis of the reviewed literature, the Nordic model is in this paper is conceptualized as 
follows: The Nordic model is one of three dimensions; economic, political and social. The 
institutional arrangements that are found within these three dimensions are mutually 
reinforcing both within and across dimensions, and maintain the institutional equilibrium that 
takes a similar shape across the Nordic countries. The three dimensions can be thought of as 
three master traits: A comprehensive welfare state that emphasizes on human development 
and risk sharing, a system of central wage setting that results in wage compression and low 
income inequality, and a high level of trust in government, public institutions and one’s 
fellow citizens.  
Underneath these “master traits”, we find of course more distinct traits as we apply a finer 
level of analysis. For the purpose of answering the questions posed earlier in this thesis, six 
variables have been found relevant to the analysis and are presented in the section. For greater 
conceptual clarity, they can all be grouped under the headings of political, economic and 
social traits: Partisan positions, centralised wage setting and union and employer organisation 
density can all be thought of as political traits of the Nordic Model. Under the economic 
heading we can place wage compression and unemployment and poverty, while trust and 
legitimacy of the welfare state represents the model’s social dimension. Of course, most, if 
not all traits can be argued to belong under other headings as well, and this underlines the 
point that the traits of the Nordic Model are mutually reinforcing.  
3. The Nordic traits as variables 
The goal of this thesis is to identify where change in the Nordic model has or has not 
occurred, and to conclude whether causal links to the financial crisis can be established. To 
that end, I will consider six variables as representing the defining traits of the Nordic Model 
that could be affected by the financial crisis. Together, observed change in the variables or 
lack thereof should give sufficient grounds on which to conclude what, if any, effect the 
financial crisis has had on the Nordic Model. The variables have all been considered 
independently in previous research, but to the author’s knowledge not together as variables 
for a broader model.    
3.1 Wage compression 
Income inequality has increased across the whole of OECD since the 1980's according to a 
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recent paper (OECD 2011a) which also employ both the gini coefficient and decile 
comparison, though comparing the top 10 with the lowest 10 percent instead of the more 
common 20 to 20 comparison used later in this paper. There are in particular two observations 
of immediate interest in the papers introduction. One is the great difference in inequality 
across the OECD, with the top 10 % earning 14 times more than the bottom 10 in USA, 
Turkey and Israel compared to the 9 to 1 OECD average. The Nordic countries and much of 
continental Europe is far below this average again. Second, the gini average for the OECD 
area has increased from 0,29 in the mid 1980's to 0,316 in the late 2000's. The increase in 
inequality did not follow a uniform pattern however. Inequality started to increase some 
English speaking countries, namely the UK and USA already in the 1970's, with continental 
Europe and the Nordic countries following suit in the 1980's and 2000's respectively. Quite 
interestingly, differences grew faster in the Nordic countries than anywhere else in the 2000's 
according to the paper. 
The paper cites several possible explanations for the rise in income inequality; globalization, 
increased part-time work, single-person households, lower tax rates for the top brackets and 
more (mer her). It furthermore problematize the concept of inequality and globalization, 
urging researchers to be clear on what kind of inequality they study and what kind of 
“globalization” they explain rise in inequality with. (++ mer her) 
The observation that the Nordic countries feature a low degree of income inequality due to 
wage compression has been made by many scholars studying the Nordic countries. Among 
others, Barth et al and Alesto et al consider this one of the defining traits of the Nordic model, 
and will therefore be included here. This variable carries with itself the advantage of being 
less difficult to test by measuring change by simply being a numerical variable. It carries with 
it the challenge of definition however, and I will therefore use the most common 
operationalization, that is comparing the income of the top decennial with the bottom 
decennial in the same manner as Barth et al. If a change towards more income inequality 
and/or less wage compression can be linked to the financial crisis, this would indicate that the 
crisis has had an effect on the model in short or long term. 
To measure wage compression and inequality I have made use of the Eurostat measure of 
income distribution and gini coefficient. These two means of measures have a high degree of 
correlation between them as they measure related numbers but are conceptually somewhat 
different. A quick correlation analysis show a correlation of 0,92 in the dataset used here. 
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The gini coefficient is a score between 0 and 100, where 0 is perfect equality (everyone has 
exactly the same income) and 100 is perfect inequality (one person receives all the income) 
(Danmarks statistik 2011).  It should be noted that the gini coefficient is usually reported as a 
number between 0 and 1, but has in this case been multiplied by 100 to convert it to a 
percentile measure for clarity. In other words, the lower the gini coefficient, the lower is 
inequality in the group measured the group here being the population of Norway, Sweden, 
Finland and Denmark. For example, the gini coefficient of the whole Danish population was 
28,0 % in 2011, when the gini coefficient is converted to percentiles. 
The other mean of measure used here is the s80/s20 rate. This rate measures the ratio of 
income between the top and bottom 20 % in a given group by dividing the former on the 
latter. The result then show how many more how much more the top 20 earn compared to the 
bottom twenty. To once again use Denmark as an example, the s80/s20 rate in 2011 was 4,36, 
meaning that the top 20 % had an income 4,36 times that of the bottom 20 % (Danmarks 
statistik 2011). 
Data availability is a challenge when considering inequality in the Nordic countries. For all 
countries except Denmark where data is provided by the ministry of law, the national statistic 
bureaus conduct surveys each year and have continues time series with starting dates from 
1966 (Finland) to 1986 (Norway). This creates some uncertainty on how comparable the data 
is, and the fact that neither OECD nor Eurostat provide times series for the whole period 
cautions against using data gathered separately from each national database. I will therefore 
rely on the datasets provided by Eurostat since their data have few missing years, albeit only 
available for all countries from 1997 and 2003 in the case of the s80/s20 rate and the gini 
coefficient respectively.  
3.2 Trust and Legitimacy of the welfare state 
Whether a product of or a precondition for the Nordic model, a high level trust in ones fellow 
citizens, government and public institutions is a defining feature of the Scandinavian 
countries. While trust alone can hardly explain the success of failure of the Nordic model, it 
can fruitfully be used as an indicator for change in other fundamental premises of the Nordic 
model. If trust is a result of income equality, generous welfare schemes and job security, a 
change here would imply change in one or more of the concerned variables. Conversely, if 
trust is a precondition for the Nordic Models success, a downward change here would imply 
poorer prospect of the current state of affairs. Trust is of course an inherently difficult feeling 
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to conceptualize into a variable, and its validity may be questioned, but for this purpose I 
believe the European Social Survey data has been obtained with required rigor. 
The third dimension, the social dimension, in the Nordic model is perhaps one of the most 
difficult to measure as it concerns individual perception of and feeling towards both other 
people and society in all its complexity. The European Social Survey (ESS) has made asked 
respondents in 36 countries a wide range of questions on many topics regarding politics, 
values, society, religion and more. Among these I have found four to be of particular use in 
this study, as they combined measure the level of trust towards ones fellow citizens, the 
stance towards income redistribution, trust in the state and general stance on egalitarianism. 
Together, I believe these four variables are able to capture the essential traits of the social 
dimension: Trust in ones citizens and the state, support for income redistribution (wage 
compression) and the legitimacy of a universal welfare state. 
The legitimacy of and public support for the welfare state is another factor stressed by several 
authors, in particular Barth et al who finds it a necessary, but not sufficient condition as the 
institutional arrangements must also garner support from powerful actors on both sides of 
Capital and Labour. The support from both sides to centralized wage setting, so called 
solidary wage setting, is possible because of the benefits received by the bottom of the wage 
pyramid and the wage restraint at the top that benefits employers. Consequently Barth et al 
see the welfare state and central wage setting as mutually reinforcing, financially, politically 
and in terms of power balance. ((se også Alesto, p 24-)). Bo Rothstein and Eric Uslaner 
(2005) link income equality and social trust with support for universal rather than means-
tested welfare policy. Their findings suggest that income equality leads to higher general 
trust, that is trust across groups and not just within, which they see as essential for the 
legitimacy of a universalistic welfare state. This variable can be measured by using survey 
data from the European Social Survey, and will be operationalized by the following 
indicators: 
 Government should reduce difference in income levels. This indicator measures the 
level of support for the idea that differences in income levels should be reduced and 
that the government has a responsibility to make it happen. The indicator has been 
constructing by adding the categories “Agree strongly” and “Agree” together.  
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 Government should not reduce difference in income levels. As above, but measuring 
the opposite sentiment. Constructed by combining the categories “Disagree strongly 
and Disagree” 
 People can be trusted measures how trustworthy people consider their fellow human 
beings to be in general. It is thus both an indicator of trust both within and across 
social groups that does not discriminate on any cleavage. This variable comes in two 
versions: (All) and (Reduced) where the former is constructed by combining all 
categories above “neutral” (6-10) and the latter by omitting category 6, thus including 
category 7-10. This is done to show the between country variation at higher levels of 
trust. Following Rothstein and Uslaner, there should be a noticeable correlation 
between this variable and income equality.  
 People should have equal opportunities/be treated equally represents a more general 
egalitarian sentiment beyond that of income equality. 
 Trust in the state is an indicator constructed by combining the positive answers (6-10) 
in the ESS variables “Trust in the legal system” and “Trust in the country’s 
parliament” to represent a general trust in the state independent of government. The 
Nordic countries do in general show a high level of trust in its state institutions in stark 
contrast to for example the United States. This trust, it is argued by Rothstein and 
Uslaner, stems from the Nordic countries stable record of good governance, low levels 
of corruption and lack of repression.  
Change over time in negative direction in the scores of either statement could indicate a 
possible challenge to the Nordic model, and if connected to the time of financial crisis could 
suggest the effect on the latter on the former.  
3.3 Unemployment and poverty 
“Work for everyone” was the parole of the social democratic governments who rose to power 
in Norway and Sweden during the Great Depression in the 1930’s (Barth et al. 2003), and has 
remained a policy goal for the social democratic parties to this time, if somewhat toned down 
with economic realism. It is times of rising and persistent high levels of unemployment in 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland that has attracted critics of the Nordic model in particular, 
foreseeing the eventual doom of the model as it fails to keep employment rates up and public 
expenditure down (Andersen 1997). However, as shown by Andersen, the ability to keep the 
unemployed out of poverty even in times of economic hardship is one of the achievements of 
the Nordic model. As an indicator then, if rising levels of unemployment is observed without 
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a significant increase in the number of people living in relative poverty, the Nordic model 
could be said to weather the crisis. And vice versa, if both unemployment rates and the 
number of people living in relative poverty increase, the model could be said to not cope with 
the effects of the financial crisis in its current form.  
The data used to investigate this relationship are collected from the OECD and Eurostat 
databases to provide data on unemployment and poverty respectively. From the OECD data I 
make use of the Harmonised Unemployment Rate (HUR) which is available for most OECD 
countries in the entire period. The data are based on household surveys, which is widely 
agreed upon to be the most reliable source of data on labour market key statistics (OECD 
2013). As always, there is an inherent risk in comparing what is essentially national data 
across countries, but probably less so with unemployment than with other indicators such as 
poverty in the section below. I do however not believe there to be any reasons to question 
OECD’s methodology in comparing and harmonising unemployment rates, and the data 
should therefore be comparable. 
While comparing unemployment across the Nordic countries is relatively unproblematic, that 
is not the case when it comes to levels of poverty. Constructing comparable rates of poverty 
across countries is very difficult for a number of reasons: The numbers are heavily influenced 
by the definitions used, which vary in each country due to difference in tax and redistribution 
systems, household income distribution, the coverage and costs of public and social services 
and various cash benefit schemes to name a few of the many methodological problems, in 
addition to difference in data collection (Kirkeberg, Epland og Normann 2012). In addition, 
OECD and Eurostat operate with different definitions of poverty, 50 % and 60 % of median 
income respectively. The latter is the most widely used, also by national statistical bureaus 
and will therefore also be used here. 
To create comparable data on poverty, Eurostat has made use of both ex-ante and post-ante 
harmonisation (Eurostat 2013). This has produced numbers that are quite different from the 
numbers reported by national statistical bureaus, illustrated in the table below. 
Table 1 Comparing National and Eurostat RoP levels 
Country National RoP (2004-2012) Eurostat RoP (2004-2012) 
Finland 13,19 17,24 
Norway 9,66 15,42 
Sources: Eurostat, SSB (2013), Statistics Finland (2013) 
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As we can see in table 1, there is a difference in the average RoP levels between Eurostat and 
national statistics of 4,1 % and 5,8 % in the case of Finland and Norway respectively. The EU 
60 % of median income definition of poverty has also come under attack in recent public 
debate in Norway, when it was revealed that Norway had a higher percentage of its 
population in relative poverty than Bulgaria (Slettholm 2013 ). Exactly how those calculations 
were made is not detailed in the article, but by comparing the RoP rates of Norway and 
Bulgaria, we can quite clearly see that this is not the case in the Eurostat database where the 
average RoP rate of Bulgaria in the period 2008-2012 is 47,71 % compared to 14,68 % in 
Norway. That a family with four children, one parent at home and a yearly income of 685 000 
NOK (roughly 9100 Euro) would be considered poor with the EU definition is used as 
another example of flawed definition in the article. Patriotic indignation aside, the fact that 
median income levels in Norway are only second to Luxemburg in the OECD also translates 
into a poverty line threshold that is much higher than in the other Nordic countries, whose 
poverty line thresholds are between 70 % and 80 % of that of Norway (Kirkeberg et al. 2012). 
This of course further complicates comparison across countries.  
Despite the striking difference in RoP levels between national bureaus and the Eurostat 
database, I consider the latter to have an acceptable level of reliability through its 
harmonisation of RoP levels between countries. It therefore remains the best source of data 
for a cross country comparison of the relationship between unemployment and poverty at this 
time. The data from the Income and living conditions table cover the period 2004 - 2012, with 
the exception of Sweden where data is not available for 2012 (Eurostat 2013). 
3.4 Centralized Wage Setting 
A precondition for wage moderation and wage compression is the institution of collective 
bargaining or centralized wage setting. Barth et al points out that internationally and also in 
Scandinavia, economists think of strong unions as synonymous with monopoly and 
protectionism. However, they note, this view would lead to a poor understanding of the 
European labour market institutions and the distinctiveness of the Scandinavian model. A 
central point is that the Scandinavian institutions have not primarily redistributed income 
from Capital to Labour, but rather between employees themselves.  
Barth et al identifies three important consequences stemming from the institution of central 
wage setting that was introduced in the 1930’s in all Nordic countries: First, work conflicts 
were practically eliminated. From being the countries in the world with the highest number of 
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work conflicts in the interwar period, Norway and Sweden had the lowest number of conflicts 
after the Second World War. Second, what determined the setting of wages were the 
conditions facing the export industry, as the unions here were the most powerful within LO 
(Norway). The labour market institutions were thus adjusted to meet a system of international 
free trade. And third, centralized wage setting lead to gradual wage compression that over 
time generated the most egalitarian income distribution in the capitalistic world. Wage 
compression became an explicit goal of the labour unions in Norway and Sweden in the 
1950’s, but Barth et al point out that wage compression is closely connected with central 
wage setting in all advanced economies, regardless how it comes about, or whether it is an 
explicit policy goal or not.  
Measuring change in wage setting has been attempted by several scholars and received much 
attention in the comparative political literature, but has been plagued by conceptual challenges 
and sensitivity of empirical findings to the choice of wage setting measure (Kenworthy 2001). 
Several measures have been developed since the 1980's with somewhat different focus and 
conceptualization of wage setting. Kenworthy emphasise that conceptualization is of critical 
importance to construct good measures. For example, when considering wage centralization, 
Kenworthy stresses that there are three principle elements: One is the level at which 
bargaining is made, with peak/central (or national), sector/industry and company/plant as the 
three most salient levels. Second, the coverage of the bargaining is important. If only 10% of 
the workforce is covered by the central wage agreement, it does not make much sense to 
consider it a highly centralized wage-bargaining process. And third, one must establish the 
degree of horizontal centralization, that is whether a union covers employees (and employers) 
across firms/plants (and sometimes across sectors) which is the norm for Scandinavia, or if 
bargaining is more decentralized where only groups of employers negotiate within each firm 
(as in Great Britain) or unions represent all employees at each firm or plant as has been the 
tradition in Japan.  
Other researchers argue that wage centralization should not be the focus of analysts interested 
in the effects of wage setting, among them David Soskice who suggests that one should rather 
look at wage coordination (Kenworthy 2001). Wage coordination, it is argued, is 
fundamentally a behavioural concept that refers to the degree of intentional harmony in the 
wage setting process, in Kenworthys example when minor players deliberately follow along 
with what the major players decide. This concept, that of wage coordination, is highly 
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relevant for the Scandinavian case, where the export-oriented industries who are vulnerable to 
international competition negotiate first and set the frame for the following negotiations in the 
rest of the private and the public sector.  
A considerable part of Kenworthys paper is devoted to comparing the different measures, and 
demonstrating the sensitivity of empirical findings generated by different measures. Graphs 
for several countries including the four Nordics show a striking difference in empirical results 
between the six measures tested for each country. The lesson learned is thus that empirical 
results obtained from any study of wage setting must be considered in the context of the 
measure employed. Analysing the effects of wage setting is therefore inherently more difficult 
and the results more uncertain than analysis employing more standardized and defined 
concept such as GDP growth and Risk of Poverty levels. That is not to say that these and 
other concepts are beyond contestation, as have been and will be discussed in their respective 
sections, but greater care must be taken when interpreting the results from an analysis of wage 
setting, and conclusions will necessarily be less certain. 
Kenworthy found in his paper the newer measures available at the time (in particular those of 
Iversen and Traxler-Blaschke-Kittel) more developed and better suited for such an analysis 
than the earlier ones of Cameron and Calmfors-Driffil. Since then, other measures have been 
developed, and in this paper I will make use of the ICTWSS database. This database includes 
entries for 34 countries from 1960 to 2011 as of version 4, and builds in part on the earlier 
works of Traxler and Kenworthy (Visser 2013). The great advantage of this database in my 
opinion is its vast number of variables that together represent nearly every spectre of wage 
setting discussed in Kenworthys article, as well as providing much information on many more 
aspects of government involvement, legal provisions and the relative power of unions and 
employer organisation in each country. This makes it a suitable source of data for this thesis 
and data on employer organisations will be used in the section on work conflicts later in this 
chapter.  
To explore the development in wage setting in the four Nordic countries I will make use of 
four indicators in the ICTWSS dataset: Coordination, Type of coordination, Government 
Intervention in wage bargaining, and the predominant Level at which wage bargaining takes 
place. Together, these indicators cover the most relevant aspects of the wage setting in the 
Nordic Model studied here. Other aspects such as union and employer organisation density 
and coverage will be explored later in this chapter, while legal provisions such as the right to 
28 
 
strike and minimum wages (where applicable) will not be considered here. Finally, in addition 
to examining and comparing each indicator, I will construct a fifth indicator by summarising 
the score of all four indicators for each country and year as a “general wage setting” indicator 
to represent the overall centralization of wage setting. In the following paragraph I will a short 
description of each indicator to operationalize them as variables.  
Coordination of wage setting consists of an annual score from 1 to 5 that measures the degree 
of coordination in the wage setting. Each score has a set of conditions detailed in the 
codebook. I will here refer the conditions for the scores relevant to the Nordic case in the 
period covered, which is 3-5. 
 5 = a) centralized bargaining by peak association(s), with or without government 
involvement, and/or government imposition of wage schedule/freeze with peace 
obligation. 
b) informal centralisation of industry-level bargaining by a powerful and 
monopolistic union confederation.  
c) extensive, regularized pattern setting and highly synchronized bargaining coupled 
with coordination of bargaining by influential large firms. 
  4 = a) centralized bargaining by peak associations with or without government 
involvement, and/or government imposition of wage schedule/freeze, without peace 
obligation. 
b) informal (intra-associational and/or inter-associational) centralisation of industry 
and firm level bargaining by peak associations (both sides). 
c) extensive, regularized pattern setting coupled with high degree of union 
concentration. 
 3 = a) informal (intra-associational and/or inter-associational) centralisation of 
industry and firm level bargaining by peak associations (one side, or only some 
unions) with or without government participation. 
b) industry-level bargaining with irregular and uncertain pattern setting and only 
moderate union concentration.  
c) government arbitration or intervention. 
Type of Coordination refers to how coordination in wage setting is achieved, and consists of a 
scale from one to six in the codebook: 
 6 = State-imposed bargaining (incl. statutory controls in lieu of bargaining) 
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 5 = State-sponsored bargaining (this includes pacts) 
 4 = Inter-associational by peak associations 
 3 = Intra-associational (“informal centralisation”) 
 2 = Pattern bargaining 
 1= Uncoordinated bargaining  
Government Intervention describes to which degree the government actively intervenes in the 
wage setting process. Government intervention differs between the countries to a surprisingly 
high degree. While activist states by many measures, the Nordic countries do not as a rule 
intervene in interest conflicts between the parties in the wage setting process other than 
providing means of arbitration. However, the power of these state provided mediators vary 
greatly between the countries: In Denmark and Norway, the mediators can order delays in 
strikes and lockouts and force referenda on proposed solutions in a way that can override 
minorities. On the other end of state mediator power lies Sweden, where both the labour and 
employer organisation jealously guard their prerogatives and responsibility to the 
maintenance of labour peace against any form of government intervention. Finland occupies 
an intermediate position where the state mediators can delay strikes like in Denmark and 
Norway, but cannot force referenda (Elvander 1974). Furthermore, the governments may also 
intervene more actively through compulsory arbitration and forced compliance with the 
resulting settlement. Such compulsory arbitration has been very rare in Sweden and Finland 
for a number of ideological, organisational and historical reasons, while more frequent in 
Denmark and especially Norway where in the latter case it exists as more or less 
institutionalised tool for wage setting on part of the state to this day.  
In the ICTWSS codebook, government intervention is measured on a scale from one to five 
detailed below: 
 5 = the government imposes private sector wage settlements, places a ceiling on 
bargaining outcomes or suspends bargaining. 
 4 = the government participates directly in wage bargaining (tripartite bargaining, as 
in social pacts). 
 3 = the government influences wage bargaining outcomes indirectly through price-
ceilings, indexation, tax measures, minimum wages, and/or pattern setting through 
public sector wages. 
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 2 = the government influences wage bargaining by providing an institutional 
framework of consultation and information exchange, by conditional agreement to 
extend private sector agreements, and/or by providing a conflict resolution mechanism 
which links the settlement of disputes across the economy and/or allows the 
intervention of state arbitrators or Parliament. 
 1 = none of the above 
Level refers to the predominant level at which wage bargaining takes place. A level is 
predominant if it accounts for two thirds or more of the total bargain coverage rate for a 
given country and year.  
 5 = bargaining predominantly takes place at central or cross-industry level and there 
are centrally determined binding norms or ceilings to be respected by agreements 
negotiated at lower levels. 
 4 = intermediate or alternating between central and industry bargaining; 
 3 = bargaining predominantly takes place at the sector or industry level; 
 2 = intermediate or alternating between sector and company bargaining; 
 1 = bargaining predominantly takes place at the local or company level 
Finally, the Centralized Wage Setting variable is constructed through addition of scores on the 
other variables for each country and year. The score is then divided by three for ease of 
comparison. This variable is to represent the general level of centralized wage setting in the 
Nordic countries, and should be seen as a tool for comparison and not a variable 
conceptualized in detail.  
With these five variables, we should be able to identify changes in the wage setting process in 
the Nordic countries that may have large consequences for the institutional equilibrium that 
serves as the fundament for the Nordic Model. Should the wage setting process become less 
centralized over time, then we should see a corresponding decrease in wage compression. 
This may not happen, and could then be a result of either that the relationship between wage 
compression and centralized wage setting is not as theorised, or that change in wage 
compression as a result of recused centralisation in the wage setting process takes time to 
come into effect, and that the results may not be visible yet.  
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One of the hallmarks of labour institutions the Nordic countries is that of general agreements 
between labour and employer organizations that impose labour peace between negotiations. 
That is, most types of strikes and lockouts are outlawed in the duration of an agreement, 
which are typically made for one or two years depending on country and sector. These 
agreements came about both due to the high number of work conflicts in pre-war Scandinavia 
and to limit government intervention 
The approach used here is one that measures the stability of the already existing centralized 
wage setting system indirectly by comparing income distribution and work conflicts across 
time and country. The logic of this approach is that wage compression is a result of 
centralized wage settings and that the number of work conflicts is directly related to how well 
the system works given that it should reduce the amount of said conflicts. In other words; if 
the income distribution remains stable or moves in more egalitarian direction while labour 
conflicts remain stable or decrease, the system of centralized wage setting must be said to 
work as intended. If either variable increase the other direction, more inequality or increase in 
labour conflicts or both, something has changed. Observations of intensified or continued 
wage setting as a result of the financial crisis could then indicate the resilience of the Nordic 
Model, while a move towards more local negotiations and away from collective bargaining 
could signal a change in the Nordic Model faced with the effects of the financial crisis. No 
change either way would suggest that the financial crisis has not had a significant effect on 
this aspect of the Nordic Model.  
3.5 Union and employer organisation density 
The Scandinavian countries have traditionally had a significantly higher percentage of the 
workforce organized in unions than continental Europe or USA, and has according to one 
narrative (Labour vs Capital) considered by Barth et al been of critical importance for the 
subsequent rise of the Nordic Model. While they are not convinced of the narrative, Barth et 
al still see trade unions as a part of the power constellation that maintains the institutional 
equilibrium that brought forth and sustains the Nordic Model. Union density has gone down 
in all the Nordic countries since its heydays in the inter- and post war periods, often in 
conjugation to changes in social insurance policies or the Ghent system (Dølvik 2013). 
Another political development that may well be relevant here is the acceptance of neo-liberal 
now widespread in the capitalist system that the Nordic countries are so intertwined in.  
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The other part of that power constellation is of course the employer organisations. As 
emphasised by Barth et al, the solidarity between employers is just as vital to the wage setting 
process and tripartite cooperation between Capital, State and Labour that is so essential in 
Denmark and Norway in particular. Without strong, centralised employer organisations that 
ensures solidarity between its members and hinders individual employers from breaking out 
and bargain with Labour locally, the employers as a collective would not be able to achieve 
the collective gains that come from reducing income inequality, namely a reduced average 
wage.  
We see here then that labour unions and employer organisation have a common interest in 
reducing income equality through wage compression: Labour unions achieve their goal of 
raising the real wage for the majority of its members (who on average earn less than the 
median wage (Barth et al. 2003)) and ensuring near full employment, and employers benefit 
from the resulting lower wages on highly qualified labour than what would be the case 
without the wage compression that comes with solidarity in centralised wage setting 
processes. Therefore, both strong union and employer organisations could be argued to be 
both a visible trait and important condition for the centralised wage setting process, and thus 
also the Nordic Model. Considering this, an increase or decline in Union or employer 
organisation density over time could indicate that there has been some institutional re-
arrangement that may the wage setting process and thus wage compression in the future. If 
change here is observed after the financial crisis, then it may be a sign of its effect on the 
future of the Nordic Model. Some studies have also proposed a correlation between union and 
employer density; when union density decrease, so do membership in employer organisations 
(Croucher, Tyson og Wild 2006). 
Labour unions have been studied in detail on many aspects over many years, and data is thus 
readily available on union density in most industrialised countries, among others from the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO 2013). Union density is here defined as workers 
organised in unions as a percentage of the total labour force.  
In contrast to labour unions, employer organisations have received less attention and there is 
very limited data available on their density. This is partly because employer organisations are 
often reluctant to publish membership figures and often lack data on how many people their 
members employ (Hayter og Stoevska 2011). The ICTWSS database contain some 
observations, ranging from 1989 to 2010, but with as few as three observations for one 
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country, Denmark, and no more than six observations at the most, as is the case for Finland. It 
can therefore not serve as anything else than a weak indicator, but may still yield some 
insights into the relative strength of employer organisations in the Nordic countries over time. 
Since there is only one observation of employer organisation density after the financial crisis 
(Finland in 2010), it is not of much relevance to the question of whether the financial crisis 
has had an impact, but will hopefully say something about the employer unions in the time 
before the crisis. Employer organisation density is here defined as workers employed in 
companies/firms that are members of an employer organisation, as a percentage of the total 
work force (Visser 2013).  
3.6 Partisan positions 
Despite a better climate for economic liberalization in the 1980’s, the political Right in 
Scandinavia have come to identify with the Nordic Model, acknowledging that the road to 
power goes via cautious reform and acceptance of the Nordic Model (Dølvik 2013). The 
Social democratic parties are unsurprisingly supportive of the model to the degree that they 
sometimes claim ownership of it. In other words, there seem to be little difference between 
party positions on the question of whether the principles of the Nordic Model should endure, 
but rather on what adjustments need to be made to sustain its viability. This has been the 
situation since the 1990’s and the banking crisis, and a sudden change in sentiment on part of 
the Political Right in the aftermath of the financial crisis could indicate that the crisis may 
have disturbed the Right’s assessment that the model should endure, and that there is 
movement in the electorate in another direction.  
The position of parties in a country towards integral parts of the institutional equilibrium that 
is the Nordic Model can tell us something about the political and ideological legitimacy of the 
model. This can be measured in a number of ways, from only considering the political 
programs of the parties to take into account every speech, remark and legislative act of each 
party, both by themselves in opposition and together as ruling coalitions. This is of course 
very detailed work that requires time and resources not readily available to all, but has 
fortunately been done in the past by Nygård (2006) who made use of the data collected and 
codes by the Manifesto research Group (MRG). Nygård tracked the partisan support for 
Welfare expansion, welfare limitation and market orientation in all four Nordic countries 
from 1970 to 2003.  
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His conclusion was that partisan positions on the welfare state have remained quite stable and 
positive, although the parties on the right have over the years adopted a somewhat less 
intensive stance on welfare expansion and become more positive to market based solutions. 
Furthermore, neither globalisation, economic conjunctures or de-industrialisation have 
resulted in abandonment of traditional Nordic welfare state values, even if more emphasis 
have been but on market related solutions to social problems. His findings are in other words 
in line with one of the mains findings of Barth et al, namely that globalisation and exogenous 
shocks such as international economic slowdown do not by themselves threaten the 
institutional equilibrium that upholds the Nordic Model. 
From the time of Nygårds study up until now, there have been a total of ten elections in the 
Nordic countries, as well as the global financial crisis that engulfed three of them. I will 
therefor replicate Nygårds study with a slightly different timeframe, namely from 1985 to 
2011, which is the endpoint for the data available at the MRG (Volkens, Lehman, Merz, 
Regel og Werner 2013). Unfortunately, there is no data coded for the 2005 election in 
Norway, which nets us eight new data points since Nygårds study in 2003.  
The MRG data are however not without problems, as Nygård details in his study. In addition, 
this replication faces the potential problem of omitting an increasingly important party from 
the Norwegian election data, the populist-right Progress Party (FRP). FRP has enjoyed 
growing electoral support during the last decade with 22,1 % and 22,9 % of the votes and thus 
becoming the second largest in parliament in the 2005 and 2009 elections respectively. In the 
most recent election of September this year, FRP was reduced to 16,3 % but entered 
government for the first time in its forty-year history together with the Conservatives (Høyre). 
It can therefore be argued that FRP should be included in the sample to better represent the 
positions of major Norwegian parties on the welfare state. However, while FRP may be an 
outlier in its enthusiasm for privatization of public services it does not exhibit any radical 
position on welfare limitation. On the contrary, FRP is one of the more vocal proponents of 
expanding the welfare state, in particular in regards to better the accommodation of seniors, 
increasing pensions and reducing the waiting time for patients in line for treatment (FRP 
2013). Where the party leaves the conventional socialist policy welfare state expansion is in 
the area of financing. Where the Left wish to finance the welfare state by taxation and the 
Conservatives by gradual privatization and reduction of benefits overall, FRP argues that the 
services themselves should be privatised as far as possible, but still fully financed by the state. 
In other words, FRP is an outlier only in the question of welfare state financing, and much 
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less so in the question of expansion or limitation. I therefore argue that it is not a major 
problem to replicate Nygårds study and thus omit FRP as long as its diverging views on 
welfare financing is kept in mind during the analysis.  
Table 2  
Countries, parties and elections 
Country                     Party                                             Elections (First-last)                 N 
Denmark                  Socialist People’s Party                   1981 – 2011                            9 
                                 Social Democratic Party                  1981 – 2011                            9 
                                 Radical Liberals                               1981 – 2011                            9 
                                 Liberal Party                                    1981 – 2011                            9 
                                 Conservative People’s Party            1981 – 2011                            9 
Finland                     VL/Left Wing Alliance                    1983 – 2011                            8 
                                 Social Democratic party                   1983 – 2011                            8 
                                 Centre Party                                      1983 – 2011                            8 
                                 Swedish People’s Party                     1983 – 2011                           8 
                                 National Coalition Party                   1983 – 2011                           8  
Norway                    Socialist People’s Party              1981 – 2001, 2009                       7 
                                 Social Democratic Party             1981 – 2001, 2009                       7 
                                 Centre Party                                1981 – 2001, 2009                       7 
                                 Christian People’s Party              1981 – 2001, 2009                       7 
                                 Conservative Party                      1981 – 2001, 2009                       7 
Sweden                   Left Communists Party/Left Party      1982 – 2010                          8 
                               Social Democratic Labour Party          1982 – 2010                          8 
                               Centre Party                                          1982 – 2010                          8 
                               Liberal People’s Party                           1982 – 2010                          8 
                               Moderate Coalition Party                      1982 – 2010                          8 
A larger issue is the lack of data for the 2005 Norwegian election which can reduce the 
explanatory power of the variable. This cannot be helped as far as I am aware, and must 
therefore be kept in mind when the data are analysed. Table 3.1 above show the parties, time 
frame and observations included in the analysis, in line with Nygårds earlier study. 
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Considering both Keynesian and more orthodox political economic theory, one could expect 
both decrease and increase in partisan positions on all three variables in the wake of an 
economic crisis. 
3.7 Summary 
Of the traits presented here, I consider wage compression, legitimacy, unemployment and 
poverty, collective bargaining and union density as the most promising variables. Alone, they 
each say something about changes in specific institutional arrangements that make up the 
Nordic Model. Together, they may help us conclude whether the financial crisis has brought 
about significant changes in the Nordic Model, or if it has once again weathered the storm of 
economic downturn. There are of course methodological challenges associated with each of 
the variables, but by applying a solid analytical framework, these should be avoided or 
mitigated to an acceptable degree.    
Kap 4: Data and Research design 
This chapter presents data used and research design applied in this study. The first section will 
elaborate on the scope of the research and its general applicability. Second the research design 
itself will be discussed, and finally the data presented in section three. 
4.1 Scope and general use 
This thesis has been motived by two desires: To assess the strength of the Nordic model in the 
face of the current economic crisis and to construct an analytical framework that can carry out 
the former at any time period. Considering that the crisis began to unfold only five years ago, 
it will quite likely be difficult to observe any major change yet. Structural changes are 
normally slow by nature and the crisis may have had consequences for the model that have 
yet to be set in motion. Conversely, the lack of data further back in time severely limits our 
ability to compare the current crisis with similar crises in the past. It is my hope and goal  that 
when more data is available both for the past and the future, the analytical framework 
constructed here can be of use to analyse the new data,  with or without modifications that 
new insights and eventual revisions of this paper undoubtedly will make necessary. It is also 
with future studies in mind that the research design has been developed. The aim has been to 
build a framework that can incorporate other variables than those studied here should they be 
more relevant for a related research question. 
Finally, while I have strived to conceptualize the Nordic Model as a relative neutral model 
that could theoretically be used on related systems in other countries with minor or major 
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adjustments, there may be a natural bias towards the social democratic notion of the welfare 
state. In this study, consisting of four distinctly social democratic countries it is strength rather 
than a weakness, but may be more problematic if used on cases other than the Nordic 
countries. Still, I believe the conceptualization to be general enough to capture the most 
important traits of the Nordic model that all the Nordic countries share, and the research 
design suitable both for this and eventual future studies. 
4.2 Research design 
The research design for this paper is a diachronic comparative study, much in the tradition of 
comparative politics started by Arend Lijphart (1971) and Stein Rokkan (Rokkan, Alldén og 
Hagtvet 1987). Since his article in 1971, the comparative method has been both praised and 
heavily criticized, the latter especially focusing on the problem of small N (King, Verba og 
Keohane 1994). Charles Ragin (1987) on the other hand demonstrate the strength and 
limitations of the comparative method, both as a classic qualitative case study and a more 
statistical variable oriented approach. Ragin goes on to exemplify three studies that have 
combined the two methods, that is using quantitative techniques to buttress the findings of a 
case study, or to apply case study “closeness” to data and deviant cases to expand on the 
statistical analysis. Ragin lauds the former in particular, but in the end makes the case for 
Boolean algebra as a superior approach to combine the best of two worlds.  Boolean algebra 
is however not suited for this study because one of its requirements is the use of binary data 
with the great loss of information this entails, contrary to Ragins argument that this is often 
not of great consequence in comparative studies. Ragin further argues that the number of 
cases in a study defines the type of the research design: A study of up to five cases is in the 
world of comparative case studies, a study from five to fifty cases belong in the domain of 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) while research with fifty cases and above should 
apply statistical methods. In this thesis there are four cases (countries) that are studied over 
time, making this a comparative diachronic study. 
In Ragins terminology, this study is one of combined strategies, using four cases and time-
series data for each variable included. While it may be true as Ragin writes that time-series 
data is not of much use when looking at variables that do not vary much over time, the 
indicators used as variables here do. Thus it is both possible and fruitful to track the change in 
the value of the variables over time to identify trends that can be compared both across 
country and variable.  
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Where this research design departs from normally employed classification is in the 
combination of quantitative data and qualitative analysis. Data is collected in large amounts 
from available sources and then analysed through a classical comparative framework 
including the dimension of time. This, I believe, enhances the strength of the analysis and 
should yield more precise results. Earlier studies using this kind of research design include 
Rudolf Andorka who to my knowledge pioneered the use of time-series data in comparative 
research in his study of the social development of Finland and Hungary (Øyen 1990). The 
greatest obstacle to the use of time series in comparative studies is the same today as Andorka 
noted twenty three years ago; the lack of internationally comparable statistical data on many 
indicators. This problem has been mitigated to some degree through the work of international 
organization and several projects, but for many interesting indicators there is still not enough 
data to make comparisons further back in time. 
Another central element of the research design is the acknowledgement that not all data are 
created equal. That is, some indicators and some findings may be more important than others. 
This insight is an important aspect of Process Tracing, detailed by Andrew Bennet (Brady og 
Collier 2010). In his examples, process tracing involves the examination of “diagnostic” 
pieces of evidence within a case that contribute to supporting or overturning alternative 
explanatory hypotheses. In this mode of analysis, one will often examine evidence at a finer 
level of detail or on a lower level of analysis than relevant theory initially indicate. The goal is 
to establish whether the events or processes within the case fit those predicted by alternative 
explanations, and are thus analogous to a detective looking for clues and piecing together 
convincing explanations to solve a crime, or a doctor trying to diagnose an illness by 
considering the patients history and symptoms.  
Process tracing can provide inferential leverage on two problems of causal inference; 
establishing causal direction and the challenge of potential spuriousness. In the first, careful 
process tracing focused on sequencing of who knew what, when and what they did in 
response can help address the question of whether X did cause Y or the other way around. 
Second, process tracing can help establish whether there is a causal chain of steps connecting 
X to Y, and whether there is evidence that other variables may have caused both X and Y. 
Furthermore, process tracing backwards from observed outcomes, as well as forward from 
hypothesized causes to subsequent outcomes, allows researchers to uncover variables they 
have not previously considered. Much like a detective can work forward from suspects or 
backwards from clues about a crime.  
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Critics, Bennett writes, have raised concerns about infinite regress and degrees of freedom 
problems about process tracing. In the first it is interjected that an exceedingly fine-grained 
level of detail may lead to infinite regress backwards that will not get the analysis anywhere 
but further down the causal chain. Second, critics worry that research on a small number of 
cases with a large number of variables suffers from a degrees of freedom problem that is 
especially problematic in statistical studies where the number of cases or observations must 
be far greater than the number of variables to obtain statistically significant results. 
Bennett’s answer to both points of critique is that not all data are created equal, and a 
researcher does not need to examine every line of evidence in equal detail. It is possible for 
one piece of evidence to strongly support one explanation or strongly weaken others, while 
numerous other pieces of evidence at the same time might not discriminate between 
explanations at all. More concretely, there are four empirical tests formulated by Van Evara 
that contributes to confirming or eliminating potential explanations. They are illustrated 
graphically below. 
Table 3: 
Four tests for Causation 
                                             Sufficient to establish causation 
                                            No                                                  Yes 
Necessary      No Straw in the wind                        Smoking Gun 
to establish     
causation       Yes                 Hoop                                     Doubly decisive 
                        
Straw in the wind tests provide useful information that may favour or call into question a 
given hypothesis, but are not decisive themselves being neither necessary nor sufficient 
criterions for accepting or rejecting a hypothesis. 
A hoop test can eliminate an alternative hypothesis but do not give direct support to a support 
that is not eliminated, being a necessary but not sufficient criterion for accepting an 
explanation. An hypothesis must “jump through the hoop” to remain under consideration, but 
doing so does not strongly affirm the hypothesis. Van Evaras example of a hoops test is the 
question “was the accused in the state on the day of the murder?” 
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A smoking gun test strongly supports a given hypothesis, but does not eliminate an 
explanation that fails the test as it is a sufficient but not necessary criterion for confirmation. 
A smoking gun in the suspects hand right after a murder strongly implicates him, but the 
absence of a gun does not exonerate him of the crime. 
A doubly decisive test on the other hand confirms one hypothesis and eliminates all others, as 
it provides both a necessary and sufficient criterion for accepting the hypothesis. One such 
piece of evidence may be enough where many straw in the wind tests may be indecisive. Van 
Evaras example here is a bank camera that catches the faces of robbers, thus implicating them 
caught on tape while exonerating all others. Such tests are naturally quite rare in in the 
context of social science but a hoop test and a smoking gun test together accomplishes the 
same analytical goal. Bennet then illustrates these tests by a several cases, among them why 
the Fashoda crisis did not result in war between Britain and France, the expansion of war 
goals of the German Empire during WW1 and the peaceful end of the Cold War. 
This case is admittedly somewhat different than the examples used by Bennett, considering 
not competing explanations but rather investigating if the premises of an explanatory theory 
hold over time, and whether a single defined event has changed the fundament of those 
premises. Nor is the search for causation so emphasised in this thesis, and is limited to 
looking at preliminary evidence of the effects of the Global Financial Crisis on the Nordic 
Model and its future. Still, the research design bears considerable resemblance. In this paper it 
is not expected that any of the variables will provide decisive evidence one way or the other 
as they all represent only a smaller part of a larger model. Furthermore, some of them can 
only provide indirect evidence depending on change or lack thereof in other variables. In 
other words, like Bennett’s examples, this thesis will look at diagnostic pieces of evidence, 
judge them by applying appropriate tests and piece them together to assess the change or lack 
thereof in several traits that together constitute the Nordic Model. For this purpose, the Hoop 
test provides a useful analytical tool to judge evidence. None of the traits investigated in this 
study are sufficient for the model as defined here, but two are necessary conditions, namely 
Wage Setting and Wage Compression. The other traits all fall somewhere between being 
straws in the wind and Hoops, but for analytical clarity I will reserve the Hoop test for those 
two traits. 
The matter of deciding what constitute a significant deviation is not an easy one. One could 
argue that there are two ways to measure this: Either by looking at relative deviation from the 
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norm that the mean of the Nordic countries represent. Or, one could measure against an 
OECD or EU average on these scores and see whether a country has left the «Nordic cluster», 
thus deviating from the norm. I have decided to employ both in the case of wage setting and 
wage compression variables. The reason for this is the wish to capture both relative deviation 
between the Nordic countries, and compared to an OECD or EU average. It is not unlikely 
that a country may deviate sharply from the other Nordic countries on one or two variables, 
but still remain within a clear «Nordic cluster» compared to an EU or OECD average. Since 
we are mainly interested in the robustness of the Nordic model today, I will test for these 
deviations using the 2011 scores for wage setting and wage compression in a scattergram and 
table. The first will show if there is a distinct Nordic cluster and to what degree the countries 
stay within. The latter will show the score for the Nordic countries and the average for the 17 
countries in the Euro area. Finland is included in the Euro area, so the difference between 
Euro area and the Nordic countries may be larger than reported there  
Conclusions about causal chains must therefore be made with caution and a great deal of 
consideration of all the evidence together while emphasizing that some pieces of  evidence are 
more important than others. Some variables will therefore be given more attention than others 
because they are thought of as more central to the model or expected to give more decisive 
evidence. As this thesis builds on Barth et als model, Wage Compression and Centralised 
Wage Setting are the two most important variables that will be given the most weight in the 
analysis. That is not to say that the other variables considered here are less important, and one 
should not discount the possibility that the empirical findings may urge adjustments to the 
model in favour of emphasising other variables.   
Discrimination along these lines makes the analysis more manageable and finds support in the 
theoretical and empirical literature on the subject. In short, some variables are considered 
more important than others here and will receive the most attention, but any conclusion must 
be drawn from the big picture that includes all the variables.  
I should underline though, that while quantitative data (and to a certain extent techniques) are 
used, this thesis is still qualitative in its way of drawing inference. By comparing different 
indicators over time across the countries, we may find that a country “moves away” from the 
model in one area but firmly embraces the model on another and variations in which variables 
are embraced or discarded in which country may also be observed.  
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4.3 Data 
The data used in this paper come in three main categories: annual time-series at country-level, 
biannual survey data in waves and partisan position data at election dates. The first category is 
straightforward to use as they are coded with a single country and year, while the latter two 
consist of survey data at the individual level and policy position at party level respectively. 
The survey data has therefore been aggregated to country level by calculating the percentage 
of respondents who agree, disagree or are neutral to the claims presented in the survey. These 
aggregated data can then be used as regular time-series on country level, and thus enabling us 
to chart the trends from 2002 to 2010. For the sake of continuity and comparison, the data 
from the GRM have been recoded from party to country level by calculating the mean score 
of each variable in the same manner as Nygård did in his study.  
The data do unfortunately have a few shortcomings. First, with the exception of GDP growth 
rates and labour conflicts (number and days), data seldom covers the whole period from 1985-
2012 that is of interest. Usually, data is only available from the early 2000's, and not always 
for the last year of the study, 2012. In addition, the last wave of 2012 for the ESS survey data 
is at the time of writing not available, somewhat hampering our ability to draw precise 
conclusion on the long term effects these may have on the model. 
While these shortcomings of the data narrow the scope of analysis somewhat, they can be 
overcome. The use of time-series data means that missing data for a year or period is not 
critical as it is trends over time, not cross-sectional data that is of interest. While a direct 
comparison with the Nordic banking crisis is not feasible for several of the variables because 
of lacking data, the main point of interest, the recent financial crisis can be studied in detail in 
all three dimensions. 
The data are collected mainly from the databases of OECD, Eurostat, and ILO, and from the 
national statistical bureaus where databases are incomplete, as in the case of labour conflicts. 
Data collected and coded by the Manifesto research Group (GRM) has been used to measure 
the trends in partisan positions towards three indicators of the model. 
4.4 Defining a crisis 
The first question that surfaces when one seeks to investigate the effects of a financial crisis is 
naturally just what constitutes a financial crisis? Where do we draw the line between 
recession, depression and financial crisis? These questions are not new, and those who have 
previously written on the subject have come to find that there is no straightforward answer to 
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these questions, as there is neither a commonly accepted definition nor a common theory of 
crisis (Jonung et al, 2009). To avoid a futile struggle in an attempt to settle the debate and 
introduce a definite definition, I will follow the lead of Jonung et al who define a crisis as “an 
exceptionally sharp decline in economic activity”. In other words, the larger the decline in 
real income (GDP) growth, the deeper the crisis. Jonung et al summarizes economic crisis for 
Finland and Sweden from 1877 and up to the Nordic banking crisis of the 1990's, and thus 
provides a helpful framework for classifying the economic downturn in 2007-8. Among the 
crisis that Jonung et al identifies is naturally the Nordic banking crisis. The graph below show 
the growth rates in GDP of the four Nordic countries since 1985. 
 
Figure 4.1: GDP growth 1986-2012. OECD 
Quite clearly, we see that the downturn of 2008 was even sharper, even more severe than that 
of the late 80's and early 90's across all four countries. Therefore, there should remain no 
doubt that the downturn of 2008 can be safely defined as a crisis for three of the countries in 
question; Denmark, Finland and Sweden. The Norwegian case is more ambiguous in the 
sense that the fall in GDP growth was more limited both in magnitude and time than its 
neighbours, falling only to -1,8 at the hight of the crisis, compared to -6, -6,8 and -8 for 
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Sweden, Denmark and Finland respectively. However, the fall was sharper and steeper than in 
1988 and the slump of 1998 and thus constitutes a crisis in accordance to the definition of “an 
exceptionally sharp decline in economic activity”. 
5. Analysis 
In this chapter I will analyse the empirical data that has been collected. For most variables I 
have included graphs that show the change in values over time for each country. For some 
variables I have also included tables where further examination is required. The variables 
have been organized into groups that correspond with the characteristics of the Nordic model 
for consistency. Each group of variables will first be considered independently, but the 
general analysis will connected the threads and give a more generalized overview.  
5.1 Wage setting 
As one of the two main variables in this thesis, change over time in the indicators of this 
variable is of great importance to the conclusion to be reached later. To give an overview of 
the development of these indicators over time, I have organized them in graphs by country for 
the first four indicators, and a direct comparison between the countries on the general wage 
setting variable.  
Graph 5.2 below show the development in Denmark in the period 1980-2011. Evident from 
the graph is the sometimes sharp increase and decrease in all variables but coordination from 
year to year during the 1980’s, with a final spike in 1998, again with the exception of 
coordination which dropped in that year.  
From 1986 and onward, a clear trend emerges for all indicators: Coordination of wage setting 
stabilizes on a high level that involves bargaining at peak levels with labour peace in the 
agreement duration (though ICWTSS place this at level 5). At the other end, we find 
government intervention quite stable at level 2, much as expected given the reluctance of the 
Danish state to intervene, and the responsibility of both labour unions and employer 
organisations to reach solutions through negotiations and maintain labour peace. On the same 
level we also find the type of coordination, despite its high volatility in the early 1980’s. 
Its low score reflect again the independence of the labour unions and employer organisations 
from the state, and their preference to reach settlements through negotiations on different 
levels. Finally, the level at which bargaining takes place remains stable from 1987 at the intra- 
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associational level, or “informal centralisation”, with a somewhat peculiar decrease in 1998 in 
contrast to the other indicators. 
 
Figure 5.2 Denmark 1980-2011. ICWTSS 2013.  
This spike in all indicators was due to workers for the first time in  42 years refusing to 
support a joint mediation proposal in a ballot, eventually prompting state intervention to end 
the conflict (EIRO 1998). Considering that the Nordic Banking crisis took place in the early 
90’s and the Global Financial crisis from 2008 and onward, the graph suggests that these 
crises has not had any noticeable effect on the centralisation of wage setting in Denmark.  
Turning to Finland, we see a rather different picture with indicators showing sharp increase 
and decreases at 3-4 year intervals. Trends here are less stable, but all indicators stay operate 
on a score between 3 and 5 until 2006 where the type of coordination drops sharply from 5 
(state sponsored bargaining) to 2 (pattern bargaining) in the period 2006-2010 before 
returning to the previous level in 2011. Of note here is also that Coordination of wage setting 
is perfectly correlated with (hidden behind) Type of coordination 1983-1988 and with Level 
of Bargaining 1988-2011. 
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Figure 5.3 Finland 1980-2011, ICWTSS 2013 
Government intervention varies between score 3 and 4 during the period covered, that is 
between influencing outcomes indirectly through indexation, price ceilings, public sector 
wages of other means, and tripartite bargaining respectively. We can also see that wages are 
bargained at a higher level than in Denmark, in most years either at peak/national level (5) or 
at the sector/industry levels (3), with something in between (4) in the period 1984-87.  We 
also note a fall in all indicators both around the time of the Nordic Banking crisis and the 
Global Financial crisis. Whether this fall is fully or in part caused by the economic crises is 
difficult to tell without looking at other indicators as well.  
In the case of Norway we see a trend of relative stability from 1995 and onwards where all 
indicators but government intervention remain at their 1995 levels except in the year 2000 
when there is a spike in all indicators except government intervention due to a strike in the 
private sector involving some 80.000 workers after a joint proposal was rejected by LO 
members in a ballot (EIRO 2000). The type of coordination is the indicator that has the largest 
change over time in Norway, falling from the highest level (6) in five of the 11 years from 
1980 to 1990, which implies state imposed bargaining in those years, to stabilize at level 2 
(pattern bargaining) from 1994 until present day with the exception of the year 2000 when it 
reached 4. 
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Figure 5.4 Norway 1980-2011, ICWTSS 2013 
The level of bargaining also receives a lower score on average from 1995 and onward than in 
the preceding 15 year period, moving from “intermediate or alternating between central and 
industry bargaining” (4) on average to a level of bargaining that “predominantly takes place at 
the sector or industry level” (3). Contrary to the type of coordination and the level of bargain, 
the coordination of wage setting is in general at a higher level after 1994 than in the preceding 
years, stabilising at “centralised bargaining by peak associations with government 
involvement” where the government in Norway represented by the National Mediator 
(Riksmekleren 2013 ).  
Finally, government intervention in Norway deserves special attention. The Norwegian 
government is in the literature known to intervene more often than its counterparts in any of 
the other Nordic countries (Elvander 1974). As we can see from the graph, intervention in the 
wage setting process was frequent in the 1980’s, with compulsory arbitration in 1981, 1982 
and 1984, as well as wage law based on NHO/LO agreement in 1988 and government 
imposed wage and price freeze in 1989 (Visser 2013). Since 1998, government intervention 
has stabilised at 3, meaning indirect government influence over the bargaining outcomes 
through price ceilings, indexations, pattern setting etc. Of note is that the large strike in the 
year 2000 did not prompt more direct government intervention. The last year of which there is 
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data is 2011, but it should be noted that the government intervened with compulsory 
arbitration in a relatively small-scale strike in the petroleum sector in 2012 when the employer 
organisations threatened with lockout against all organised workers. As a consequence, the 
trade unions in question have though their confederal associations LO and YS taken action 
and brought a case against the Norwegian state to ILO, who have in earlier verdicts on cases 
regarding compulsory arbitration in the petrol sector concluded that the Norwegian state has 
violated labour conventions of which it is a legal signatory country (Jøndtvedt 2013). From 
this we can conclude that the frequency of direct government intervention in the wage setting 
process has been lower in the past 13 years on average than in the period before them, it will 
still take active part in the process, and intervene when it deems it necessary, even if in 
conflict with ILO conventions. As with Denmark, we find no evidence to suggest that the 
recent financial crisis has had any effect on any of the indicators.  
Continuing to Sweden in figure 5.5, we also find that all indicators stabilise from 1997 and 
onwards, with government stabilising two years later. We see no increase or decrease in any 
indicator from 1999 to 2011. As for general trends, we note the same volatility in the 1980’s 
and early to mid-1990s as in Denmark and Norway respectively. As expected from the 
literature, government intervention has stayed at low levels throughout the greater part of the 
period, with some notable exceptions on the mid-1980’s and early 1990’s. This stands quite in 
contrast to the more interventionist state in Norway. The type of coordination has also 
stabilised at the same low levels of pattern bargaining as in Denmark and Norway since 1998. 
The coordination of wage setting too follow roughly the same trajectories in the late 1990’s as 
in Denmark and Norway, stabilising at the relatively high level “of centralised bargaining by 
peak associations with government involvement” (4) from 1997 and onwards. Finally the 
most noticeable trend is that the level of bargaining has decreased from the highest of level 
(5) meaning that “bargaining predominantly takes place at central or cross-industry level and 
there are centrally determined binding norms” at several years in the 1980s and early 90’s to 
stabilising at the level where “bargaining predominantly takes place at the sector or industry 
level” (3).  
Similar to the cases of Denmark and Norway, we cannot see any increase or decrease in any 
indicator in the time period of the financial crisis, and thus find no reason to suggest that the 
financial crisis may have had an effect on centralised wage setting in Sweden.  
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Figure 5.5 Sweden 1980-2011, ICWTSS 2011 
5.1.1 Adding together 
By adding the scores of all four indicators together we can construct an overall score for 
central wage setting. The scores are then divided by three to reduce the scores evenly for a 
better fit within graph parameters. The result is a directly comparable measure of wage setting 
centralisation in the four Nordic countries, and one trend is immediately evident: With the 
exception of Finland, the overall centralisation of the wage setting process has decreased in 
all four countries from the early 1980’s in the case of Denmark, late 80’s in Sweden and the 
middle 90’s for Norway. Finland remains quite volatile and generally alternates between 
scores of 4 and 6,3 with some exception, once again pointing towards more or less stable 
intervals at which the degree of centralisation in the wage bargaining increase or decrease.  
An interesting observation to be made here, as well as in the country specific graphs, is what 
seems to be a developing convergence between Denmark, Norway and Sweden on all 
indicators except government intervention. 
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Figure 5.6 Centralized Wage Setting all countries 1980-2011, ICWTSS 2013 
This convergence becomes clear in this graph where we can see that Denmark and Sweden 
achieves the exact same score from 1994 to 2011 with the exception of 1998. From 1994 we 
see that Norway approaches the scores of Denmark and Sweden, and after the spike in 2000 
stabilises at only 0,3 points higher for the rest of the period. 
An effect of either financial crisis is not apparent from the graph. That is somewhat 
surprising, considering what looked like a possible correlation between indicators and the two 
crises in the case of Finland (maybe Norway too). Furthermore, from the literature we might 
expect that centralization would either increase in times of economic hardship if unions, 
employer organization and the state realized a mutual interest in reaching quick and moderate 
wage settlements to mitigate the effects of such an external shock. Or, we could expect a 
decrease in centralization if the crises increased incentives for certain employer organization 
and trade unions to break away from the coordinated wage settings to realize individual 
advantages. The table below show the correlation between the centralized wage setting 
indicator, a one-year lag of the same indicator, and rates of economic growth and 
unemployment. Unemployment and GDP are chosen as to represent economic crises as they 
are both sensitive to economic downturn. This correlation table provides a measure of the 
general relationship between centralised wage setting processes (CWS) and economic activity 
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and not strictly economic downturns. But if GDP growth (or loss) and unemployment rates do 
not have an effect on the wage setting process in general, then there is little reason to expect it 
to have any effect during a financial crisis either.    
Table 4 Correlation Wage Setting, HUR, GDP. OECD,MRG 
Country HUR GDP Std. dev 
HUR 
Std. dev 
GDP 
Std. Dev. 
CWS/lag 1 
  N 
Denmark: CWS 
                CWS lag 1 
-0,06 
0,002 
0,3 
0,2 
 1,616  2,120 2,210 / 2,576 29 
Finland: CWS 
               CWS lag 1 
0,02 
0,05 
0,07 
0,17 
 3,734  3,679 2,581 /  3,500 24 
Norway: CWS 
               CWS lag 1 
0,56*** 
0,58*** 
0,1 
0,13 
 1,053  1,704 2,484 / 2,906 23 
Sweden: CWS 
               CWS lag 1 
-0,32 
-0,15 
-0,51 
-0,28 
 2,642 2,421 2,596 / 2,685 29 
Significance levels: p=<0,05** p=< 0,01*** 
In the table we see that only a correlation of statistical significance between centralised wage 
setting and economic activity is only found in Norway where wage setting is relatively highly 
correlated with unemployment. Since unemployment did not increase much during the Global 
Financial Crisis in Norway, it stands that this crisis has had little if any effect on the degree of 
centralisation of the wage process in Norway. Finland gives us some reason to pause, since 
one could argue that judging by the graph, the centralisation of wage setting fell remarkably a 
year before the financial crisis and stayed low throughout the crisis, to rise again in 2011. The 
correlation table on the other hand suggests no general relationship between economic activity 
and wage setting centralization in the country. 
From the graphs and correlation table we must therefore conclude that while there may have 
been an increase in wage setting centralization during the Nordic Banking crisis in the 1990’s 
in the three countries affected, the latest financial crisis does not seem to have had any effect 
on the degree of centralization in the wage setting process in either of the four Nordic 
countries, with a possible exception of Finland of which evidence remain ambiguous.  
5.2 Wage compression  
To measure wage compression and inequality I have made use of the Eurostat measure of 
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income distribution and gini coefficient. The graph below shows the evolution of the s80/s20 
rate in the four countries since 1995 until 2012. 
 
Figure 5.7 S80/s20 rate 1995-2012. Eurostat 
As we can see, the s80/s20 rate was between 2,5 and 3,5 in all countries in 1997, then to 
increase markedly as the economic conditions improved up to 2001 where it stabilized in the 
case of Sweden and Finland. Norway on the other hand experienced a sharp increase from 
2004 to a record 4,8 in 2006, then to fall sharply and come down to 3,2 in 2012 as the lowest 
among the Nordic countries. The sharp increase and decrease will be elaborated in when 
discussing the gini coefficient in the next paragraph. Denmark in contrast has the lowest ratio 
among the Nordic countries in 1997, but rose steadily from 2001 and reached its highest level 
in 2009 until the effects of the financial crisis brought the ration down to 4,4 in 2011 as the 
highest among the Nordic countries. Unfortunately we lack data to look further into the past, 
but it can be reasoned that among the causes of the relatively low s80/s20 rations in the 
middle 90’s and the drop in 2009 is the Nordic banking crisis and the Global Finacial crisis 
respectively. This is because economic turmoil generally inflicts greater losses on high 
income individuals as stocks and other assets fall sharply in value (Danmarks statistik 2011).  
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Figure 5.8 Gini coefficients 2000-2012. Eurostat 
The graph above shows the evolution of the gini coefficient for the four countries between 
2000 and 2012. While the timespan is shorter, it exhibits in general the same trend as the 
s80/s20 rate: The coefficient is stable in the case of Sweden and Finland, while it significantly 
increases and decreases from the early 2000’s to 2011 in the case of Denmark and Norway 
respectively. Where the gini coefficient differs from the s80/s20 rate is that it does not seem 
to be much affected by the Great depression in 2008/9. The sharp increase and decrease in 
both the s80/s20 in Norway between 2004 and 2007 must be commented. While no final 
explanation exists, it is quite likely that we here see the effect of what was dubbed a 
“utbyttefest”, or “dividend pay-out feast” as companies paid out substantial dividends to its 
shareholders at effectively 0% tax in 2005 before a tax reform in 2006 would close this 
loophole (de Flon 2007),  (Finansdepartementet 2008).  
In the case of Finland and Sweden there is a slight fall in the period 2009-2010 before 
increasing slightly towards current date. In Denmark it merely flattens between 2009 and 
2010 before continuing its steady increase, while the fall in Norway starts in 2007, that is 
before the Great depression could have any noticeable effect on the Nordic countries. It is 
therefore more likely to be a general trend independent of the Great depression. In all, both 
the s80/s20 ratio and the gini coefficient have remained generally stable for Finland and 
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Sweden, while it has increases and decreased for Denmark and Norway respectively. The 
Global Financial Crisis does not seem to have had more than temporary effects on the longer 
trend for any of the countries.     
5.3 Unemployment and poverty 
By using the framework of Andersen (1997) we can compare the development of 
unemployment and risk of poverty trends in the four Nordic countries. The graph above 
shows the evolution of the HUR (Harmonized Unemployment Rate) in the four countries for 
the period 2000-2012. 
 
Figure 5.9 Harmonised Unemployment Rates 2004-2012. OECD 
The HUR rate develops as we might expect, with a clear increase in the period of 2008 to 
2010 where it stabilizes and falls somewhat for all countries. As detailed in the previous 
chapter, the Great Recession has caused a significant economic slowdown in all the Nordic 
countries except Norway, where the rise in unemployment levels far less than among its 
neighbours, and to this day remains below the higher levels seen in 2005. Denmark has here 
seen the sharpest and largest raise in unemployment of all the Nordic countries, reinforcing 
the perception of it being among the hardest hit countries in the OECD. One curious 
observation to be drawn from this graph is that the unemployment rates of Denmark, Finland 
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and Sweden converges almost uncannily in 2011 at between 7,5 and 8 %, and remains 
relatively convergent to this day. 
The risk of poverty rate on the other hand is less telling on the outset. As shown in the graph 
below, Finland’s ROP rate stays remarkably stable during the time frame, while the ROP rate 
of Sweden fluctuates wildly. Denmark and Norway follow a roughly similar trajectory, but 
start to diverge in equal direction on 2008/9: Where the Danish ROP rate increases 
significantly, that of Norway falls sharply between 2007 and 2008, increases slightly towards 
2009, and then falls through the crisis to the lowest level of all countries in 2012.  
 
Figure 5. 10 Risk of Poverty (RoP) rates 2004-2012. Eurostat 
Of interest to note here is also that the ROP rate in Denmark and especially Norway follow a 
trajectory quite similar to that of the wage compression. As the inequality increases sharply in 
Denmark around 2008-2009, the ROP rate follows suite immediately. Similarly in Norway 
but in the opposite direction, when income inequality falls sharply from its peak in 2006, the 
RoP rate follows a similar path with a one year delay. 
When we compare the two graphs there are two particularly interesting observations that can 
be made. First, the HUR and ROP rate of Denmark follow an almost identical pattern, quite 
contrary to what was expected from the findings of Andersen. Second, there does not seem to 
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be a pattern in the case of the other Nordic countries. To illustrate the differences between 
countries further, the table below show the correlation between ROP and HUR for each 
country. As gleaned from the graph, the case of Denmark is one of almost perfect match with 
a correlation of 0,9151 while the other countries vary between 0,4 in the case of Finland and a 
mere 0,17 in the case of Norway. The sample is unfortunately very small, only nine 
observations for each country, with the exception of Sweden of which we only have eight 
observations of both HUR and RoP rates in the same year. Normally this would imply a high 
chance of observing only random variation, but since the fit between the HUR and RoP rates 
in the case of Denmark is so striking, I have also tested for statistical significance for the 
correlation in each country. 
Table 5 Correlation HUR-ROP 
Country Corr HUR/ROP Std. Dev. HUR Std. Dev. ROP         N 
Denmark 0,9151*** 1,695 1,032 9 
Finland -0,4053 0,764 0,305 9 
Norway 0,1706 0,67 1,005 9 
Sweden 0,3433 0,905 1,032 8 
Significance levels: p=<0,05** p=< 0,01*** 
The correlation between unemployment and poverty rates in Denmark is statistically 
significant at 1%, while the correlation in the other countries is not remotely statistically 
significant, as one would expect from the low correlation. In the case of Denmark we then see 
both a strong substantive and statistical significance, that is both a high degree of correlation 
(very high in this case) and a confirmation that the chance of this being a spurious correlation 
is almost certainly zero (Acock 2010) 
This does first of all tell us that there are important differences in how unemployment and 
poverty interact in the Nordic countries. From both the graph and table, we could draw the 
conclusion that the welfare scheme in Denmark that previously ensured that those 
unemployed did not face a drastically higher chance of economic exclusion is no longer 
works as that way. And in contrast, that the welfare scheme in the other Nordic countries 
achieve a high degree of success in preventing the unemployed from facing economic 
exclusion through poverty. While these conclusions seem reasonable with the data available 
to us at this moment, one should always retain a healthy dose of scepticisms towards broad 
conclusions based only on such a short period. There may very well be other factors that 
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contribute to the apparent correlation between unemployment and poverty that cannot be 
uncovered within the framework of this thesis. However, it is clear that the relationship 
between unemployment and poverty takes on a different character in Denmark than in its 
Nordic neighbours. And based on the available data, we must conclude that the consequence 
of unemployment measured in risk of economic exclusion is likely to be more severe in 
Denmark than in the other Nordic countries.    
5.4 Union and employer organisation density 
From the literature it is expected a stable or decreasing union density, and according to one 
train of thought, also a corresponding decrease in employer organisation density. In the graph 
below we can make two immediate observations. One is that Norway is an outlier at a 
significantly lower level of union density than the other three countries, who all occupy a 
band of now more than 12 % apart at the most, and that they converge at just below 70 % in 
2008. The trend is a steady decline since 1993, and the three countries follow a very similar 
trajectory that seems to follow the unemployment rate to some degree until the mid-2000’s, 
and flattens out at the time of the Global Financial crisis, with a small increase in Finland 
from 2008 to 2010.  
 
Figure 5.11 Union density 1985-2012. ILO 
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Second, the union density in Norway follow the development of its neighbours, but from a 
much lower starting point of 57 % against 82 % in Sweden, and its decline is much milder, no 
more than around 5 % from the highest point in 1991 to its lowest in 2008.  
The difference in union density between countries is often explained by the benefits that 
unions offer the unemployed. Norway is the only country among the Nordic in which does not 
employ the Ghent system, and where workers thus have less incentive to join trade unions 
because unemployment benefits are not dependant on trade union membership. We call also 
see in the graph that the decline in union density ends in 2008, after which there is a slight 
increase in Finland and Norway in the next two years before flatting out. In Denmark and 
Sweden there is no increase after 2008, but the union density seems to have stabilised in those 
two countries in the period after the Global Financial crisis, with a minor decrease in Sweden 
from 2010 to 2011. Immediately then, we could suspect that the financial crisis of 2008 may 
have had an effect on union density in slowing the or even reversing the decline in union 
membership.  
The link between unemployment and union membership is broadly speaking presented in two 
different narratives with opposite causal links: The narrative of “Labour marker rigidities” 
holds that union density has a negative effect on unemployment, that is to say high union 
density increased unemployment rates by contributing to the inflexibility of the labour 
market. However, when unions contribute to coordination in the wage setting process, the 
negative effects are largely cancelled out (Nickell 1997). The other narrative specialized for 
the Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland and Sweden hold that rising unemployment 
increases union density, as the three countries employ the so called Ghent-system where 
unions are strongly involved in the provisions of unemployment insurance (Van Rie, Marx og 
Horemans 2011). Workers therefor have strong incentives to unionise, in particular when 
unemployment is on the rise.  
Table 6 Correlation HUR-Union 1985-2012. 
Country Corr HUR/Union Std. Dev. HUR Std. Dev. Union   N 
Denmark 0,586*** 1,618 3,431  28 
Finland 0,796*** 3,734 4,016  24 
Norway 0,914*** 1,047 1,621  33 
Sweden -0,239 2,623 5,347  30 
Significance levels: p=<0,05** p=< 0,01*** 
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Conversely, we may therefore expect that union rates may drop when unemployment goes 
down, though there may be other explanations of the decline, such as the reform of the Ghent 
system in Sweden that may account for its sharp drop since 2006 (Kjellberg 2009). Table 6 
show the result of a list wise correlation analysis between the Harmonized Unemployment 
Rates and Union density.  
As expected in the case of Denmark and Finland, union density and unemployment rates are 
positively correlated and statistically significant at 1 %. Unemployment and union density is 
also highly correlated and statistically significant in Norway, more so than in any other 
country, but it is unclear why this is the case as membership in Norwegian trade unions offer 
no immediate benefits to the unemployed. Since Norway also has the lowest unemployment 
rate of the Nordic countries, it would be far-fetched to argue that the opposite causal 
relationship is true here, that unions cause unemployment. Sweden is the only country where 
there is neither statistically or substantive correlation between unemployment and union 
density in the time period, though that may be the result of an already high unionisation arte 
and the reform of the Ghent-system. A correlation analysis of a different period may yield 
other results; though dropping the years since 2006 only changed the direction of the 
correlation, but did not increase its statistical significance.  
When we turn to employer organisation density, we unfortunately have less data to work with, 
barely enough to plot trends for one or two decades in each country, as displayed in figure 
5.12 below.  
One striking observation here is that the organisation rate among employers is exceptionally 
high in Sweden, on par with union density at its peak in the early 1990’s. The same historical 
reasons that partly explain high unionisation rates in Sweden also explain employer 
organisation density: As mentioned in the section on the centralised wage setting process, 
unions and employer organisations jealously guard their prerogatives to bargain without 
interference from the state, and thus depend on a very high rate of organisation and 
centralisation on both sides. In contrast to the union density, the employer organisation 
density does not fall much in Sweden during the period, and rises notably in Denmark, 
Finland and Norway. Literature on the subject suggests that as union density decreased, so 
would employer organisation density as employers would come to question the viability of 
sectorial agreements (Croucher et al. 2006). While this may be one of the factors explaining 
the reduction in union density in Germany, it seems unlikely to be a mechanism present in the 
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Nordic countries as union density in all countries except Sweden has increased while union 
density has fallen.  
 
 
Figure 5.12 Employer organisation density, 1989-2010. ICTWSS 
Given the very limited data that leaves the majority of years unaccounted for and the sparse 
literature on the subject, it is difficult to suggest factors that contribute to seemingly 
increasing employer organisation density in the Nordic countries. Since we only have one 
data point after the Global Financial crisis, Sweden in 2010, it is not possible to say whether 
the crisis has had any effect on employer organisation density in the Nordic countries.  
5.5 Trust and legitimacy 
We first look at the level of trust between citizens in the Nordic countries. As mentioned in 
the section on variable operationalization, the trust variable has been measured in two ways; 
by including all positive scores after the median (6-10), and by skipping the first positive 
score after the median (7-10). This is done to illustrate the difference in trust levels at higher 
scores by excluding scores close to the median, which is the segment that only trusts others “a 
little”.  
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
9
0
E
m
p
lo
y
e
r 
O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
 D
e
n
s
it
y
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
year
Norway Denmark
Sweden Finland
61 
 
The two most striking observations in the first graph that includes all positive scores is that 1), 
the level of trust in Denmark, Finland and Norway are particularly high, with Denmark at the 
top in average, while Finland and Norway converge at almost 75 % in 2012. And 2), that 
Sweden starts at 10 % lower than Finland in 2002 and ends at only a slightly higher score in 
2012, now 12 % behind Finland. In other words, Sweden is here a clear outlier with a lower 
level of trust between its citizens than its Nordic neighbours. We also note a sharp decline in 
Sweden from 2010 to 2012. 
 
Figure 5.13 People can be trusted (6-10) ESS 
The next graph (figure 5.14) that omits the positive score closest to the median show a similar 
pattern, but also reveals a more clear cut difference between the Nordic countries, with 
Denmark as the country with the highest level of trust, followed by Norway and Finland with 
Sweden at the bottom. The difference between Sweden and Finland is somewhat less dramatic 
here, but the distance up to Denmark is roughly the same. The sharp decline in the level of 
trust in Sweden from 2010 to 2012 is also clearly visible here.  
This stark difference between Denmark, Finland and Norway at the upper band of trust to 
Sweden at a distinctly lower level is something of a puzzle that to my knowledge has not been 
given much attention. 
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Figure 5.14 People can be trusted (7-10), ESS 
One paper that studies the determinants of social trust in general finds that exogenous factors 
like protestant religion and ethnic homogeneity are statistically have a significant effect on 
generalised trust, as do endogenous factors like income equality, good governance and 
government social spending. It also notes that there is a Nordic exceptionalism at work, where 
the Nordic countries are in a group of their own at the very top of the generalised trust scale 
(Delhey og Newton 2005).  
As all the Nordic countries are protestant and Sweden has a lower income inequality in 
Denmark, we are left with ethnic homogeneity and good governance as possible explanations. 
Sweden has a tradition for a less strict immigration policy than Norway and Denmark with, a 
considerably higher percentage of its population that are non-western immigrants or their 
descendants (Green-Pedersen og Krogstrup 2008). However, the same study shows that 
immigration is higher on the political agenda in Denmark than in Sweden, where it is next to 
ignored by the major parties. When we later look at the levels of trust in the state in the 
Nordic countries and employ this as a proxy for good governance, we also find that Sweden 
scores lower than its neighbours here as well up until 2010 and falls sharply in 2012 again.  
One could speculate that less ethnic homogeneity together with less trust in the state could 
partially explain the lower level of trust in Sweden than its neighbour countries, but it remains 
5
0
5
5
6
0
6
5
7
0
P
e
o
p
le
 c
a
n
 b
e
 t
ru
s
te
d
 (
R
e
d
u
c
e
d
)
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
year
Norway Denmark
Sweden Finland
63 
 
a speculation at best. Especially the observation that Swedish public discourse does not give 
this matter much attention compared to Norway and Denmark speaks cautions against such a 
conclusion, in addition to the short period of time the ESS survey covers.  
Since the level of income inequality is the indicator of wage compression, we would expect 
that the low level of income inequality in the Nordic countries corresponds with a high level 
of support for income redistribution by the state. The graph below show the percentage that 
“Agree strongly” and “Agree” that the government should reduce income difference.  
 
Figure 5.15 Government should reduce difference in income. ESS. 
Not surprisingly given its relatively high degree of income inequality among the Nordics, 
Denmark has the lowest score of the Nordic countries on this variable. More surprising 
perhaps is that Norway, with the lowest level of income inequality among the Nordic 
countries, except in the 2006 round, is well behind Sweden and Finland in support for income 
redistribution by the state. It appears then that there is not necessarily a direct relationship 
between the public support for income redistribution and the actual extent of income 
redistribution. A correlation analysis shown in table 7 below offers no support for a direct 
relationship between these two variables for any of the countries. There seems to be a 
substantial correlation in the case of Finland, but it is not statistically significant, not even at 
10 %.  
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Table 7 Correlation Gov-s80/s20 2002-2012. 
Country Corr Gov/s80s20 Std. Dev. Gov Std. Dev. S80/s20   N 
Denmark 0,073 1,504 0,476  4 
Finland 0,673 3,567 0,105  6 
Norway -0,057 5,743 0,599  6 
Sweden -0,4 2,342 0,134  5 
Significance levels: p=<0,05** p=< 0,01*** 
Since all of the questions asked in the survey data contains a neutral category, either labelled 
“neither agree nor disagree” or simply represented as the median value, it could be interesting 
to see how large a percentage of the sample that does not agree (or strongly agree) with 
redistribution express the opposite point of view; that government should not reduce 
difference in income (Disagree or Strongly disagree).  
 
Figure 5.16 Government should not reduce difference in income. ESS. 
The graph above tell us that the low scores on support for income redistribution by the state in 
Denmark is not caused by a large ‘neutral’ segment, but rather a that a large portion of the 
Danish respondents oppose income redistribution by the state. Furthermore, In 2002 and 
2004, a larger portion of Danes were against income redistribution by the state rather than in 
favour of it; 44,41 % vs 43,41 % and 39,29 % vs 38,01 % respectively. We can also note that 
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the neutral segment is on average over time quite similar between the Nordic countries at 
roughly 20-22 % in Denmark, Norway and Sweden and somewhat lower at around 17 % in 
Finland. Finally, we see a decrease in all countries from 2010 to 2012, but since there is a 
corresponding increase from 2008 to 2010 in all countries but Sweden, it is unlikely that this 
can be linked to the Global Financial crisis.  
From the data above on support for income redistribution by the state we might expect that we 
should find similar results when we investigate another measure of egalitarian attitudes in the 
Nordic countries; that Denmark should be an outlier here as well with a general less 
egalitarian attitude of its citizens. The graph below show the scores of each country on the 
statement that it is “Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities” 
 
Figure 5.17 People treated equally/have equal opportunities. ESS. 
While the graph shows that Denmark has the lowest score in this variable as well, there si less 
distance between Denmark and Norway than between Norway and Finland. Furthermore, no 
country scores less than 80 % except Denmark in 2002, and the positions of the countries 
relative to each other is roughly the same here as in the previous graphs that measured support 
for income redistribution, or economic equality: Finland have the highest scores on both 
(except the graph above in 2010 and 2012), followed by Sweden, Norway and Denmark at 
fourth. However, the percentage of respondents that is in favour of general equality as this 
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variable measure is significantly higher in all countries than the percentage in favour of 
income redistribution by the state. This could mean several things. One, there may be a clear 
conceptual difference in how economic and general equality is perceived by the Nordic 
citizens. That is to say there is an overwhelming support for the egalitarian ideal, but less so 
for active redistribution of income between groups. Or, it could mean that income inequality 
is perceived to already be sufficiently reduced, and further redistribution by the state therefor 
receives less support than the egalitarian ideal. However, both income redistribution and the 
egalitarian ideal receive the support of a clear majority of respondents in all the Nordic 
countries (except income redistribution in Denmark). Finally, we can also note a rising trend 
in the support for the egalitarian ideal in all countries except Finland, and all countries score 
between 87 and 93 % in 2012.  
The last of the variables that make up the social dimension of the Nordic model is trust in the 
state, represented by merging trust in legal institutions and trust in the parliament. The graph 
below shows the scores for each country from 2002 to 2012. 
 
Figure 5.18 Trust in the state. ESS. 
We immediately see that the scores here follow a different pattern than the previous variables, 
with much greater difference between the countries and that the trend over time is more 
ambiguous. Of particular note, we see that Sweden scores lower than the other countries on 
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average, with a bottom point of 52,2 % in 2004, then to rise sharply until 2010 when it again 
falls back to a score in 2012 that is slightly above what it displayed in 2008. Norway follows 
a similar trajectory with the identical score as Sweden in 2002, but its score continues to rise 
past 2012 to converge with Denmark as the country with the highest trust in the state in 2012. 
Finland and Denmark also follow roughly the same pattern, increasing the score from 2002 to 
2006, and then decreasing until 2010, before rising again to a score in 2012 that is higher than 
that of 2002 in both countries.  
Here it is important to remember that this variable is created by merging variables that 
measure trust in the country’s legal system and trust in the country’s parliament. The table 
below show the average score of those two variables for each country 
Table 8 mean score trust  in legal system and trust in parliament, 2002-2012. ESS 
Country Trust in legal system, 
mean 
Trust in parliament, 
mean 
Denmark 80,9 63 
Finland 77,7 60,3 
Norway 72,7 56,2 
Sweden 63,2 56,9 
 
We see here that there is a large difference between the degree to which the respondents trust 
the legal system of their country and their parliament. In Denmark and Finland, the difference 
is roughly 17 %, while the difference in Sweden is much lower at 6,3 %. Similar to the 
variables that measure generalised trust in the Nordic countries, Sweden is the outlier with a 
lower score both at trust in the state at the two variables that are combined to create the 
former variable. It is difficult to explain this variation between the countries within the limits 
of this study other than what has been suggested in the section on generalised trust. I shall 
therefore be content here to show the notable difference in scores both between countries and 
within the countries over time. We are left with the impression that the general trend for 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden is one of slightly increased trust in the state since 2002, with a 
significant downturn in the period of 2008-2010 in Denmark and Finland with Sweden 
following suit two years later. Trust in the state decreased slightly from 2002 to 2004 in 
Norway, but has increased every year since 2004, and the country has the highest level of trust 
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in the state in 2012 of all the Nordic countries at 73,44 % with Denmark as a close second at 
73,25 %.  
The difference in where the fall in trust in the state occurred in time could be understood in 
terms of the Global Financial crisis for three of the four countries when we note that Denmark 
and Finland fell from 2008 to 2010 while Norway did not, which corresponds to the severity 
of the crisis in each country: Denmark and Finland were hit hard both in terms of fall in GDP 
growth and rise in unemployment, while Norway escaped relatively unscathed. This 
perspective is strengthened when we look behind the graphs and find that both the increase 
and decrease in the scores for Denmark, Finland and Norway is explained almost entirely by 
change in the respondents trust in parliament. It could therefore be hypothesised that the trust 
in parliament is influenced by the perception of how well the government (here represented 
by the parliament) has handled the financial crisis. The subsequent increase in the scores of 
Denmark and Finland from 2010 to 2012 is also almost entirely due to an increased trust in 
parliament, but is more difficult to explain as the growth in both countries slowed after a 
strong rebound in 2010. The factors that explain the increased scores for Sweden from 2004 
to 2010 are less clear as we should expect a fall similar to that of Denmark and Finland when 
the crisis hit Sweden in 2008-9, but instead follows a sharp slowdown of growth from 2010 to 
2012. Here too the increase and decrease of the trust in state is largely explained by variation 
in trust in the parliament, with a solid increase from 60 to 69 % from 2008 to 2012, and a 
subsequent decrease to 61 % in 2012. It can perhaps by hypothesised then that the Swedes 
were initially pleased with how the government handled the financial crisis, but were less 
pleased when the growth rate plummeted from 2010 to 2012.  
In short, the trust in the state has on average increased from 2002 to 2012 in all Nordic 
countries, with Norway seeing the largest and most stable increase. There is also indications 
that the global Financial crisis may have had an effect on the citizens trust in the state through 
their trust in parliament.    
5.6 Partisan positions 
Nygård found in his study that support for welfare expansion had remained relatively stable in 
the Nordic countries, only tempered somewhat in Sweden and Finland by the banking crisis in 
the early 1990’s, and that the parties on the Right were more in favour of market oriented 
solutions rather than welfare limitation. One exception to this trend was Finland in which 
there was a sharp rise in proposals for welfare state limitation during the oil crisis of the 
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1970’s and again in the aftermath of the Nordic Banking crisis. The graphs that are shown in 
the following sections display the development in each country up to the last election 
available for each country, and have been calculated with the same parties and variables in the 
previous study. 
5.6.1 Welfare state expansion 
The graph below show the change over time in partisan positions on welfare state expansion 
in the four countries from the middle 1980’s up to the time of writing. 
 
Figure 5.19 Partisan positions on welfare state expansion 1987-2012. MRG 
As we can see from the graph above, partisan position on welfare expansion has been 
relatively stable also in the period after Nygårds study, but with visible between-country 
variation. Of particular note, we find that since the 2002 election, political parties Sweden 
have become steadily more positive to welfare expansion while Norway has remained fairly 
stable. Both Finland and Denmark experience sharp drops around the mid-2000s. Overall 
though, party positions remain fairly stable, with a slight increase in emphasis on welfare state 
expansion in the election programs of the Nordic parties. Not unexpected, scores vary much 
more from data point to data point on this and the following graphs due to the shifting nature 
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of election programs that may vary considerably from year to year without there necessarily 
being a dramatic shift in party positions overall.   
If we now consider the change over time against the backdrop of two financial crises, the 
early 1990’s and 2008, there seems to be little if any correlation between economic crisis and 
change in support for welfare state expansion. We try to look a bit closer by applying the 
standard listwise correlation to see if there is a relationship between welfare state expansion 
and economic downturn, here represented by harmonised unemployment rates. I have chosen 
this rather than GDP growth as voters and thus parties are likely more sensitive to change in 
unemployment than GDP rates, as the former directly affects portions of the electorate while 
the latter have little direct relevance on most voters in the short run. The unemployment rate 
in the election years is used in the analysis, and the results are shown in the table below.  
Table 9 Corr HUR-Welfare. OECD, MRG. 
Country Corr 
HUR/Welfare 
Std. Dev. HUR Std. Dev. 
Welfare 
  N 
Denmark -0,172 1,536 4,454 10 
Finland 0,376 3,268 5,881 6 
Norway -0,396 1,165 3,039 5 
Sweden 0,495 2,92 3,901 8 
Significance levels: p=<0,05** p=< 0,01*** 
As we see in the table, we find no statistical or substantial correlation between economic 
downturn represented by unemployment rates and partisan positions on welfare state 
expansion in any of the countries. However, there are a number of conceptual and technical 
problems that make this and later correlation analysis unreliable. For one, elections are not 
held every year (and not even at regular intervals in Denmark in the beginning to the middle 
of the period), thus begging the question of which unemployment year should be set for the 
election year. The unemployment rate of that year? An average since the last election? Or the 
average of the two preceding years if we assume that voters have short memories? Second, 
the uneven number of observations between the countries, where Norway has only half the 
observation points as Denmark, also make between country comparisons more problematic in 
this case than on the preceding variables. And third, it is far from certain that unemployment 
is the best way to measure economic downturn in this case, and the exact causal links between 
economic downturn and what parties write in their programs are rather unclear. In addition, 
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what is written in party programmes may not be the same as what is focused on in election 
campaigns, as issues have a habit of turning up and claiming much of the attention during 
election run ups. In such cases, the party program may be less relevant to actual party 
positions than one might expect. On the other hand it could be interjected that party programs 
are what guides the party outside elections, and therefore have more importance in the long 
run and thus the policy decisions that are made. 
Returning to the graph, it is thus little evidence to conclude that the two economic crises of 
the past twenty-five years have had much effect on partisan positions on welfare state 
expansion. The trend of increased support for expansion in Sweden started before the 
financial crisis of 2008. As noted earlier, there are reasons to expect a change in either 
direction as a result of economic crisis, and in the short term it could be argued that Sweden 
and Denmark has seen an increase in support for welfare expansion after the crisis with a 
corresponding decline in Finland. However, looking further back this may be normal variation 
in the case of Denmark and Finland while Sweden stands out as a country with a stable 
increase in support. The partisan position in Norway have become slightly more positive to 
welfare expansion in Norway since the late 90’s, but the fact that data for the 2005 election 
and the recent 2013 election are not available, together with the problem of FRP mentioned 
earlier, makes it difficult to say anything definite about the development in Norway.  
5.6.2 Market economy orientation 
In the case of Market Orientation Economy, we can see in figure 5.20 below that the emphasis 
on private alternatives or complementary services has been proposed by Swedish parties to a 
greater extent than its neighbours throughout the 1990’s until the early 2000’s when the 
attraction to market oriented solutions seem to have waned to a level comparable to that of 
Norway.  
Political parties in Denmark and Finland seem to have followed similar trajectories in their 
emphasis on market oriented solutions, which seems follows the path of increased emphasis 
in times of economic growth and decrease in times of economic hardship. In the context of 
the Financial crisis, the rebound and decrease in unemployment rates between 2010 and 2011 
could be seen as a cause for the increased emphasis on market oriented solutions that 
converge in the 2011 elections in both countries. However, the growth in GDP that picked up 
in 2010 has slowed down again, and turned negative in Finland in 2012 and barely positive in 
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Denmark. It is therefore difficult also here to judge the possible effect of the financial crisis 
on partisan positions, and a correlation analysis may therefor shed some light on the matter. 
 
Figure 5. 20 Market economy orientation 1987-2012. MRG 
However, the correlation analysis here suffers from the same shortcomings as the previous 
one. Again, unemployment rates are chosen as a proxy for economic downturn, and the 
results are shown in table 10. 
Table 10 Corr HUR-Market. OECD, MRG. 
Country Corr 
HUR/Market 
Std. Dev. HUR Std. Dev. 
Market 
  N 
Denmark -0,1 1,536 2,825 10 
Finland 0,527 3,268 2,177 6 
Norway 0,0859* 1,165 0,959 5 
Sweden -0,048 2,92 0,364 8 
Significance levels: p=<0,1* p=<0,05** p=< 0,01*** 
We do not find any relationship between economic downturn represented by unemployment 
and emphasis on market solutions at acceptable levels of statistical significance in this 
sample. There is a relationship significant at 10 % in Norway, but considering that we lack 
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much data for Norway there is even less reason than usual to set the 10 % level as acceptable. 
We must therefore limit ourselves to observe the general trend on this variable, which is an 
overall decrease in emphasis on market solutions in all countries since the middle and late 
1990’s until 2011 where it seems to receive more attention in the national elections in 
Denmark and Finland.  
5.6.3 Welfare state limitation 
Finally, we turn to partisan positions on welfare state imitation, or retrenchment as it is also 
called. The first thing can note is a considerable spike in proposals for welfare limitation in 
Finland around the 1995 election. Nygård explains this as a culmination of demands for 
welfare cuts due to the effects of the Nordic banking crisis of the early 1990’s (Nygard 2006). 
 
Figure 5.21 Welfare state limitation, 1987-2012. MRG 
Political parties in Norway and Sweden seems to keep a low profile on welfare state 
limitation, or reject the ideas outright. There is a slight increase in Norway during the 1993 
and 1997 elections and in Sweden during the 2006 election, but both countries end up at 
roughly the same score as they started at the end of the 200’s. The missing data for the 2005 
election in Norway leaves us uninformed of the situation then, but considering the trend 
throughout the period and the political climate it is rather unlikely that welfare limitation was 
emphasised by any of the parties in 2005. Danish parties have been more open to cuts in the 
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welfare state in 1994, 2005 and recently in 2011 where the acceptance for discussing policies 
for limiting the welfare state is at a an all-time high in this period.  Finland, as noted earlier, 
stands out as the country where the parties have been the most eager to emphasise welfare 
cuts, and that in times of economic hardship. This is illustrated by the spikes in the aftermath 
of the Nordic Banking crisis and at the onset of the Global financial crisis. We investigate this 
further in a correlation analysis presented below, once again using unemployment as proxy 
for economic hardship.  
Table 11 Corr HUR-Limit. OECD, MRG. 
Country Corr HUR/Limit Std. Dev. HUR Std. Dev. Limit   N 
Denmark 0,393 1,536 0,737 10 
Finland 0,795* 3,268 1,461 6 
Norway 0,508 1,165 0,218 5 
Sweden 0,06 2,92 0,181 8 
Significance levels: p=<0,1* p=<0,05** p=< 0,01*** 
As expected, there are no statistically significant relationships between unemployment and 
welfare state limitation, although Finland comes very close to the accepted 5 % level, but still 
remains too uncertain to be deemed statistically significant. We can however talk about a 
substantial correlation between unemployment and welfare state limitation in Finland, much 
in line with Nygårds earlier findings. In short then, there has been very limited emphasis on 
welfare state limitations by the political parties sin the Nordic countries during the period of 
interest, with the exception of Finland where this issue seems to gain some importance in 
times of economic crisis, though the shortage of data, conceptual problems with the 
correlation analysis and no statistically significant results make this conclusion less certain 
than what is immediately apparent.   
5.7 Summary 
This section will summarise the findings in the analysis, and is divided in two parts. First I 
will look at the robustness of the institutional equilibrium that is at the basis of the Nordic 
model. In others words, I will assess how strong the model stands measured by scores 
achieved on the variables analysed here, and the development over time that together 
represent the six traits of the Nordic Model. Second, I will test the statistical significance of 
the changes that have occurred after the Global Financial crisis through an ANOVA test by 
comparing the mean score of each variable before and after the financial crisis. This is done to 
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obtain more robust results and greater certainty about the conclusions. Through the analysis, 
we have found indications that suggest an effect of the financial crisis on several variables, 
but I believe that such observations alone are not enough, and that a means comparison is 
therefore necessary. 
5.7.1 The robustness of the institutional equilibrium  
The first and most important question in this thesis has been just how robust the institutional 
equilibrium that the Nordic Model rests upon really is. By looking at the development over 
time on the variables that make up our five traits, we can note the following findings: First, 
we see that the centralisation of the wage setting process has decreased in all of the Nordic 
countries except Finland, and stabilised after the late 1990’s. Finland has on average a higher 
level of centralisation in the wage setting process, but also much larger variation from year to 
year. The average level of wage centralisation is still relatively high in the Nordic countries 
compared to more “liberal” countries such as the United Kingdom, France and the USA. 
Second, as mentioned in the OECD study (2011a), wage compression measured by the 
s80/s20 rate and the gini coefficient has decreased in the Nordic countries since the 1980’s, 
that is income inequality has increased. The exception here is Norway in which income 
inequality increased until 2006, since when it has fallen to the lowest level among the OECD 
countries. Denmark on the other hand has seen a substantial increase in income inequality, 
with Finland and Sweden in between Denmark and Norway. However, while wage 
compression has decreased, income inequality in the Nordic countries is significantly lower 
than most of central and southern Europe and the Anglo-Saxon countries. .  
To measure deviations from the Nordic model I have plotted the gini coefficient and wage 
setting scores for the Nordic countries as well as several other European countries in the 
graph below. As we can see from the graph, Norway and Sweden are close both in terms of 
wage compression represented by the gini coefficient and in the level of centralisation in the 
wage setting process. When we consider wage compression alone, the Nordic countries do 
form a cluster of low income equality together with Austria, the Netherland and Belgium. 
Denmark is the outlier here, closer to Germany and Cyprus than Norway and Sweden, while 
Finland is still close enough to Norway and Sweden to be comparable.  
In terms of centralised wage setting, Denmark, Norway and Sweden form a close cluster 
together with Austria, Germany, Italy, Slovenia, Slovakia and the Netherlands, with Finland 
as the outlier who is only second to Belgium in the centralisation of the wage setting process. 
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However, we have seen in previous sections that the centralisation is liable to periodic change 
in Finland, which would for example place it at identical value as Sweden and Denmark in the 
previous year, 2010.    
 
 
Figure5.22 Gini Coefficient and Centralised Wage Setting in 2011. Eurostat, ICTWSS 
For a closer look, we investigate the difference in the mean value of centralised wage setting 
(CWS) and wage compression between the Nordic countries and the Euro area average in the 
table below. The difference to the average of the 17 euro countries are displayed in 
parentheses. Greece is dropped from the Euro zone in CWS because of missing data. 
Table 12 CWS, Gini and s80/s20 in 2011, Nordic countries and Eurozone. Eurostat, ICTWSS 
Country CWS Gini s80/s20 
Denmark 2,75     (-0,15) 27,8  (-2,7) 4,4   (-0,7) 
Finland 4,75     (1,85) 25,8  (-4,7) 3,7   (-1,4) 
Norway 3          (0,1) 22,9  (-7,6) 3,3   (-1,8) 
Sweden 2,75     (-0,15) 24,4  (-6,1) 3,6   (-1,6) 
Euro zone 2,9 30,5 5.1 
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In table 12 we can see that the Nordic countries do not on average have a more centralised 
wage setting processes than the Euro zone average. In all cases but Finland the Nordic 
countries have on average a lower level of centralisation than the Euro zone average. At the 
same time we note that wages are more compressed in the Nordic countries than the Eurozone 
average, and that Denmark is an outlier in its closeness to the Eurozone average. It can 
therefore be argued that Denmark fails the Hoop test on wage compression and constitutes a 
significant deviation from the Nordic model when compared to its neighbours. The table also 
imply that either it is not the level of centralisation in the wage setting processes that matter 
so much for wage compression in the Nordic countries today, or that the measure for 
centralisation does not capture all of the difference between the Nordic countries and the other 
countries measured. It may also mean that there have been other factors at work in the Nordic 
countries that have led to wage compression in addition to a centralised wage setting process, 
as we can see that Spain and Portugal have both a higher level of centralisation and a 
considerably higher degree of income inequality that points to a low level of wage 
compression. Finally, it could also be that centralisation in the wage setting process was 
important for wage compression to become so ingrained in the Nordic countries that later 
decentralisation has not lead to much greater income equality. Following that logic, we could 
conclude that even with a decrease in the level of centralisation in the wage setting process, 
the process still ensure wage compression in all the Nordic countries except Denmark. 
Looking at the secondary traits, we find that poverty has remained fairly stable in Finland and 
Sweden since 2004, fallen in Norway and increased considerably in Denmark. Unique for the 
case of Denmark is the statistically significant and substantial correlation between 
unemployment and risk of poverty rates in Denmark. This indicates that the unemployment 
schemes in Denmark are less effective than those of the other Nordic countries in mitigating 
economic exclusion for the unemployed. Further, we note that union density has fallen from 
the early 1990’s in all the Nordic countries, but stabilised and even increased slightly since 
2007-8. We also find a statistically significant correlation between unemployment and union 
density, suggesting that more workers organise in times of economic crisis, in large part 
because of the Ghent system in Denmark, Finland and Sweden. We also see that employer 
organisation density has increased steadily in the period that we have data for. And while 
union density has decreased across the board, the unionisation rate of the Nordic countries is 
still very high in comparison to the OECD. 
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We have also investigated the social dimension through various measures of trust and support 
for economic and general equality. Here we find that the Nordic countries score very high on 
trust in both other citizens and in the state, with Sweden as something of an outlier with a 
lower score than the other Nordic countries. Trust in the state and fellow citizens have on 
average increased in all countries since 2002, but with some variation between countries. 
Trust in people and state have fallen somewhat in Sweden from 2010 to 2012, while trust in 
the state has steadily increased in Norway since 2002, going from the lowest to the highest 
score among the Nordic countries. Support for income distribution has on average decreased 
somewhat in all the Nordic countries, but still remain at very high levels with the exception of 
Denmark which never rises above 50% unlike the rest of the Nordic countries. In contrast, 
support for the egalitarian ideal has increased in all countries except Finland since 2002 to a 
very high level, with Denmark at the bottom where 87 % agree that people should be treated 
equally and have equal opportunities, and Sweden at top with 93 % in 2012. 
Finally, we have looked at partisan positions on welfare state expansion, market orientation 
and welfare state limitation. Here we find that emphasis by political parties on welfare state 
expansion has generally increased in the Nordic countries since 1987, except in Finland where 
there has been a marginal decrease. The Swedish parties have on average emphasised private 
solutions and other market oriented policies to a greater degree than parties in its 
neighbouring countries, up until the early 2000’s where emphasise fell to a level comparable 
to Norway, in which the parties have been rather quiet about the issue. The Norwegian case is 
however more uncertain, as the pro-privatisation (and welfare expansion) progress party has 
not been included. In Denmark and Finland, parties have increasingly emphasised market 
solutions since the mid 2000’s. And lastly, among the Nordic countries, only political parties 
in Finland have loudly suggested welfare state limitation during the aftermath of the Nordic 
Banking crisis in the early 1990’s and apparently to a similar extent on the onset of the Global 
financial crisis. Norwegian and Swedish parties have kept a low profile on the issue or 
rejected it outright, while Danish parties seem to have warmed somewhat to the idea at 
regular intervals in 1994, 2005 and 2011. 
 5.7.2 The Global Financial crisis. 
The second research question in this thesis has been whether or not the recent financial crisis 
has had an effect on the Nordic Model as specified here. By looking at the graphs, we are left 
with the impression that this has not been the case for any variable or indicator. However, 
while the graphs may be unanimous at a glance, a statistical analysis could give important 
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insights not immediately available by studying graphs alone. I have therefore compared the 
means of each variable for each country before and after the crisis to determine if there is a 
statistically significant variation between them. The cut-off point has been set to 2009 and the 
starting year to 1995 since the countries had all mostly recovered from the banking crisis of 
the early 1990’s by that point. Thus, that all years up until and including 2009 has received 
the value 1, and the years from 2010 and onward the value 2. Not unexpectedly, the short time 
that has passed since 2009 does not make this an optimal tests, and because of the lacking 
data on elections in Norway, the partisan positions on welfare expansion, limitation and 
market solutions have been omitted as there is no data available after 2009.  
There are also other problems associated with this approach. One is that since all the variables 
are tested country by country and are year’s rather than different subjects they violate the 
ANOVA assumption of independent cases. That is to say, when running a test for each 
country, we test variables within the same case, and may therefore not be independent of each 
other. Because of this we are likely to get too liberal significance values, meaning that the 
analysis may report a statistically significant difference when in reality the difference is not 
statistically significant. Other methods of analysis have been considered, but the limited data 
post-crisis unfortunately ensures that critical assumptions are also violated in the case of 
repeated measures ANOVA and paired sample t-tests. In addition, at my level of proficiency 
these methods do not handle panel data well, and are more suited for a study with many cases 
and few variables, rather than one of few cases and many variables like this one. Finally, the 
method used here test the difference for each variable for each country instead of each 
variable with every country, thus making between country comparisons easier. In short, the 
significance test conducted here should be treated as a preliminary test with limited data that 
may yield too liberal significance results which should be interpreted accordingly. All 
variables have their mean scores compared before and after 2009 in the other three countries. 
The results of the mean comparison are displayed in the ANOVA tables below, one for each 
country.  
We first consider Denmark, which has been an outlier in terms of decreased wage 
compression and low support for income redistribution by the state. We see in table 13 that 
the measures of wage compression, the s80/s20 rate and the gini coefficient, as well as Rate of 
Poverty and Welfare Limitation have mean values after the Global financial crisis that differs 
from the mean values before the crisis and this difference is statistically significant. 
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Table 13 Denmark, between groups (combined), 1995-2012 
Denmark N  Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
Squares 
F Sig 
Wage Setting 17 0,502 1 0,502 0,126 0,728 
S80/s20 13 1,631 1 1,631 7,365 0,02** 
Gini 13 27,509 1 27,509 5,808 0,035** 
RoP 9 7,094 1 7,094 34,929 0,001*** 
Union Density 16 17,496 1 17,496 1,851 0,195 
Government should 
reduce income diff. 
6 4,014 1 4,014 0,923 0,391 
People can be trusted 6 6,12 1 6.12 1,496 0,288 
Equal opportunity/ 
should be treated equally 
6 24,883 1 24,883 2,942 0,161 
Trust in the State 6 1,76 1 1,76 0,262 0,636 
Welfare Expansion 5 5.381 1 5,381 0,265 0,642 
Market Solutions 5 2,306 1 2,306 0,204 0,682 
Welfare limitation 5 3,3 1 3,3 18,049 0,024** 
Significance levels: p=<0,05** p=< 0,01*** 
Caution should be taken when reaching this conclusion as there are few observations post 
crisis, in the case of welfare limitation only one, and since we have reason to suspect that the 
significance result is too liberal. In addition, correlation does not automatically translate 
causation, and we would be getting ahead of ourselves if we concluded unambiguously that 
the financial crisis is the sole reason for the differences observed here. 
Second, we examine Finland, whose deviation from the Nordic ‘norm’ in the previous section 
lies in a more centralised wage setting process and a greater emphasis on welfare state 
limitation in periods of economic crisis. The ANOVA analysis here finds only the difference 
in means in the support for the egalitarian ideal to be statistically significant. From the graph 
we see that the score on this variable has decreased somewhat in Finland, and has been 
generally lower after the crisis than before. 
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Table 14 Finland, between groups (combined), 1995-2012 
Finland N  Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
Squares 
F Sig 
Wage Setting 17 4,902 1 4,902 0,362 0,557 
S80/s20 17 0,087 1 0,087 1,324 0,268 
Gini 17 1,525 1 1,515 0,557 0,467 
RoP 9 0,036 1 0,036 0,352 0,572 
Union Density 17 40,998 1 40,998 2,778 0,116 
Government should 
reduce income diff. 
6 1,643 1 1,643 0,106 0,761 
People can be trusted 6 3,956 1 3,956 1.893 0,241 
Equal opportunity/ 
should be treated equally 
6 4,048 1 30,897 4,048 0,005** 
Trust in the State 6 8,3 1 8,3 1,106 0,352 
Welfare Expansion 5 25,348 1 25,348 2,061 0,247 
Market Solutions 5 4886 1 4886 0,882 0,417 
Welfare limitation 5 0,691 1 0,691 0,244 0,655 
Significance levels: p=<0,05** p=< 0,01*** 
It would appear then that the only variable on which the financial crisis may have had a 
significant effect on in Finland is its citizen’s adherence to the egalitarian ideal, which already 
was among the highest of the Nordic countries. Once again however, we cannot know for 
certain that this is solely because of the financial crisis, or that the result would be significant 
with more data, and not some other factors not analysed here.  
 
Third, Norway has proven to be an outlier in terms of a relatively low union density and on 
average falling poverty rates and income inequality which translates to increased wage 
compression. As mentioned earlier, the partisan variables are not tested in the ANOVA 
analysis since there is no data after 2009. What we do find is that the mean values of income 
inequality measured by the s80/s20 rate and Risk of Poverty rates are before and after the 
crisis are different at a statistically significant level. That income difference is reduced in 
times of economic crisis is expected but that poverty rates have not increased implies one of 
two things. Either that the levels were unnecessarily high before the crisis, or those policies 
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that aim to mitigate economic exclusion through poverty have continued to work during the 
crisis. 
Table 15 Norway, between groups (combined), 1995-2012 
Norway N  Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
Squares 
F Sig 
Wage Setting 17 0,502 1 0,502 0,3,17 0,582 
S80/s20 16 1,631 1 1,631 7,365 0,02** 
Gini 10 22,214 1 22,214 4,28 0,72 
RoP 9 4,702 1 4,702 9,758 0,017** 
Union Density 18 0,114 1 0,114 0,132 0,721 
Government should 
reduce income diff. 
6 94,36 1 94,36 5,349 0,82 
People can be trusted 6 0,198 1 0,198 0,054 8,27 
Equal opportunity/ 
should be treated equally 
6 13,104 1 13.104 6,803 0,06 
Trust in the State 6 128,88 1 128,88 14,282 0,19 
Significance levels: p=<0,05** p=< 0,01*** 
The reason for the difference in wage compression may also be due to the spike in income 
inequality in 2006, without which the analysis may have yielded a different result. Still, the 
ANOVA analysis indicates that the financial crisis may have had an effect on these two 
variables, with the qualification that more data and a different method may not yield the same 
result. 
Finally, we look at Sweden which deviates from its Nordic neighbours by generally having 
lower trust in ones fellow citizens and the state, as well as higher union and employer 
organisation density, and parties that emphasis both welfare expansion and market oriented 
solutions. Through the ANOVA analysis, we find that the mean values of union density and 
support for general egalitarianism are different before and after the financial crisis at a 
statistically different level. In the case of union density, the explanation could reasonably be 
said to be that union density has fallen substantially in the entire period, and that one could 
expect to see a similar result if the cut-of point was set for example in 2004. 
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Table 16 Sweden, between groups (combined) 1995-2012 
Sweden N  Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
Squares 
F Sig 
Wage Setting 17 0,502 1 0,008 0,126 0,728 
S80/s20 12 0,067 1 0,067 1,626 0,231 
Gini 12 1,634 1 1,634 1,495 0,250 
RoP 8 0,042 1 0,042 0.034 0.860 
Union Density 18 231,04 1 231.04 11,295 0,004*** 
Government should 
reduce income diff. 
6 1,135 1 1,135 0,190 0,685 
People can be trusted 6 2,970 1 2,970 0,251 0,643 
Equal opportunity/ 
should be treated equally 
6 11,900 1 11,900 34,511 0,004*** 
Trust in the State 6 86,564 1 86,564 5,129 0,086 
Welfare Expansion 4 45,733 1 45,733 2,912 0,230 
Market Solutions 4 24,311 1 24,311 1,077 0,408 
Welfare limitation 4 0,015 1 0,015 0,208 0,693 
Significance levels: p=<0,05** p=< 0,01*** 
However, we have also seen a sudden stabilisation and small increase during the time of the 
financial crisis, so it may well be there the crisis has had an effect. Finally, Sweden has seen 
an increase in egalitarian preference since 2008, which is at the onset of the financial crisis. It 
may therefore be possible that the financial crisis has had a significant effect on this variable. 
6. Conclusions 
The starting point of this thesis has been the continuous debate on the robustness of the 
Nordic Model, here defined as one consisting of a political, economic and social dimension 
which are mutually reinforcing. The most important traits of this model is a system of 
centralised wage setting that ensures wage compression, a comprehensive welfare state that 
pools risks and provides care from cradle to grave, a high degree of trust in ones fellow 
citizens, the state and a strong preference of both economic and social equality. All these 
traits reinforce each other, but the wage compression that follows a centralised wage setting 
process is the fundament and lies at the core in this relationship. It is in this institutional 
equilibrium that the Nordic Model is made possible and thrives. The first aim has therefore 
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been to assess the robustness of this model today; ten years after Barth et al conducted their 
analysis which is the fundament of this thesis.    
Second, the Global Financial Crisis is the greatest economic malaise that has affected the 
Nordic countries since the Great depression in the 1930’s. The crisis have, like other crises in 
the past, been said to bring an end to the Nordic Model, and has therefore been an important 
part of this thesis as the secondary research question: Has the Global Financial crisis disturbed 
the institutional equilibrium that the Nordic Model rests upon? 
By investigating the variables that together make up the traits in the Nordic model over time, 
we have found that the institutional equilibrium is still robust and even seen changes that are 
positive in terms of strengthening the robustness of the Nordic model, such as increased trust 
and preference for egalitarian positions. However, we have also seen a falling degree of wage 
compression that may have followed in the wake of less centralised wage setting processes in 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden, as well as declining union density and support for income 
redistribution in all the Nordic countries. On the other hand, the Nordic countries still score 
higher on income equality (wage compression) than the Euro zone average, and coupled with 
the observation that increased partisan emphasis on welfare state expansion and low profile 
on welfare state limitation make a strong case for the conclusion that the Nordic Model 
remains robust in the foreseeable future. This study shows some significant variation between 
countries on certain variables however, and Denmark fails the Hoop test for wage 
compression. There is therefore less certainty about the robustness of the Nordic Model in 
Denmark, while the answer to which factors have lead Denmark on a path to higher income 
inequality is not known at this time. We also find that the relationship between a centralised 
wage setting process and wage compression may not be as straightforward as the model 
predicts, exemplified by Spain and Portugal which have a higher degree of centralisation than 
the Nordic countries, except Finland, yet a much higher degree of income inequality. 
The effects of the Global Financial Crisis on the Nordic Model appear to be quite limited and 
only statistically significant on a few variables, and even then with much uncertainty given 
the data and method employed. It is therefore difficult to assess just how much the financial 
crisis alone can explain of the variation, and I will therefore conclude that the financial crisis 
has only had marginal consequences for the institutional equilibrium of the Nordic Model in 
the short run, if any at all. In other words, the institutional equilibrium that upholds the Nordic 
Model seems to have weathered the Global Financial Crisis well.  
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However, not much time has passed since the financial crisis, and especially the decrease in 
wage compression in Denmark should worry those who wish for a continuation of the 
outcomes that results from policies based on the Nordic Model in that country. In general I 
would argue that it is too early to conclude on the long term effects of the Global Financial 
crisis on the Nordic model, even if its effects are marginal or none-existent in the short run.  
Finally, the analysis of the traits that make up the Nordic models have shown significant 
variation between the countries on several variables, with one country often being a clear 
outlier. The factors behind these differences are not clear, and may warrant more attention in 
the future. 
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